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INTFIODUCTION 
Industrial revolution ushered an era of plenty but 
simultaneously gave birth to many new problems. In the 
wake of industrialisation a newer form of criminality 
was born which has now assumed menacing proportions. 
Unlike traditional crimes, this newer form of 
criminality is associated with the upper and middle 
class people and is committedWthem in the course of 
their occupations. This is adversely affecting the 
health and material welfare of the community as a whole 
and is also threatening the entire economic fabric of 
the State. The criminality in these cases extend from 
smu ggling to adulteration and from tax evasion to 
frauds and misappropriation, exhibited in numerous 
permutations and combinations. The common feature of all 
this criminality is that the same is born of greed, 
avarice and rapacity and is committed in the course of 
trade, industry, commerce, business and profession of 
the upper and middle cl asses. These crimes have 
adversely affected the social and economic fabric of the 
state and the community alike and have made planned 
development for the future a very difficult job. 
C-uthe-rland has called theje crimes 'White Collar 
Crimes' while Ssyre has described them 'Public Welfare 
Offences'; there are other who call these crimes 
'Regulatory Offences'and yet others 'Crimes of Strict 
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liability'. 
Just as development in science and moral and 
social theories have ushered changes in the law of 
crimes, the restructuring of society, whether on 
account of new political thought or socio-economic 
imbalances, has also materially affected criminal law. 
Variations in criminal law are not always the result of 
a single factor; quite often they may be the product of 
the cumulative effect of many new developments. The 
development in science coupled with new notions of 
morality and new theories of sociology may sometimes 
join hands to force a change in criminal law. Likewise 
these two, may combine with the restructuring of society 
to effect alterations in the law of crimes. The new 
philosophy of communism and a shift in the iaissez faire 
have in no less measure been responsible for a 
rethinking in criminal law. We have seen that of late 
the activity has mul tiplied to a great extent. State is 
no longer a police state and is rather looked upon as a 
welfare state and this shift from state to welfare State 
has contributd.oo' in large measure to increase in the 
activity. It has opened new vistas for State 
activity.^ 
Theye changes have had their effect on the penal 
laws. Laisseez faire eeconomy has been increasingly 
yielding place to socialist economy and socialistic 
pattern of society has come to be> accepted, tacitly or 
expressly, as the cherished good of many countries. 
State in consequences is no longer a silent spectator to 
the happenings in and around it. The nefarious 
activities of many new categories of anti-social 
elements have also gone unnoticed and altogether 
unchecked by the state. More often than not, the state 
has risen to the occasion and in order to check thetit 
nefarious activiti es of the new anti-social element 
geared its adminisdvation of justice. During the course 
of the last one hundred years the concepts and contents 
of criminal law have undergone considerable change; 
while on the one hand new offences have come to 
forefront, new notions of criminal responsibility also 
have come to be re-cognised almost all the world over. 
This was not a sudden development or reaction; rather it 
was the culmination of the changes in the structure of 
the human society undergone and effected over a period 
extending over centuries which it would be proper to 
consider here. 
In the middle ages the society had a feudal 
structure in which the king and the feudal lords and 
chiefs were the centre' of gravity and were considered 
to be the foundation of justice and their word was law. 
The administration of justice was more often to suit 
their convenience and their notions of justice were by 
and large personal. Towards the end of middle ages many 
changes started appearing almost all the world over and 
particularly in Europe and England. An age of reason 
began and over a period culminated into a new era 
commonly known as Renaissance. Renaisance not only 
ushered in an age of reason but further also infus"^^ a 
sense of a scientific thinking amongst the people. The 
people started questioning every phenomenon of life and 
society. A spirit of inquiry led to the growth of 
science and the desire to "know the unknown' resulted in 
new in=ventions and discoveries, which extended man's 
knowledge about the world. Nation states began to appear 
in Europe, with distinct territories and bouundaries 
which formed well defined units. Though a spirit of 
healthy competition between nation states grew and a 
strong feeling of nationalism developed, in course of 
time this nationalism led to jealousies rivalries and 
conflicts over trade and colonies; nonetheless trade 
increased and business methods and procedures began to 
change. This stimulated production of manufactured 
goods. There was increase in demand of goods, essential 
as well as luxuries, which the traditional methods of 
production were inadequate to meet. 
Almost side by side and as a corollary a new 
movement challenging the authority of the established 
church in England and Europe also raised its head and 
this distributed the hold of Papacy upon the peop ie to 
a considerablle extent and also led to an open challenge 
to the theory of Divine Rights of kings and 
consequently laid the foundations of new political 
thought. This came to be known as the Reformation. It 
also affected the faith of People in supreme power. 
During the 18th century there began another series 
of changes which revolutionised the technique and 
organisation of production. These developments resulted 
in the rise of a new type of economy -- the industrial 
economy. The 'domestic system' under which the artisans 
and craftsmen worked in their homes gave way to factory 
system. Many new mechanical inventions and chemical 
discoveries were effected which had far — reaching 
consequences, particularly in the industrial and 
commercial fields in all the European countries 
including England. This was the beginning of aniera which 
cul minated in what is now termed as the Industrial 
Revolution large scale factory system came into vogue 
which brought as its accompaniment a shift from the 
village to the cities, primarily because factories were 
located in big towns and cities inview of the facilities 
of transportation and marketing the large scale 
productions of the factories. This disturbed the entire 
social fabric and not only a new urban society came into 
being, new social groups in this urban society also 
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sprang up. There arose an altogether new social 
structure which gave birth to a challenge to the 
accepted moral and social beliefs. This Industrial 
Revolution saw the decline of home handicrafts, led to 
the growth of urbanisation, resulted in the 
expropriation of many farmers, rise of factory towns in 
the new industrial centres and a phenomenal increase in 
the production of commodities. It transformed the feudal 
order of society into a capitalistic form of economic 
and social order. It had revolutionised the entire 
concept of trade, commerce and industry and there 
started a scramble for colonies and consequently a 
spirit of competition grew amongst free nation. The 
entire perspective of things underwent change and old 
values no longer held the ground as fast as they did in 
the past. There was social disorganisation. The rise of 
colonial empires also contributed in its own way to this 
disorganisation of the social fabric. 
The Renaissance, Reformation and Industrial 
Revolution had culminated in a new society in which 
reason rather than faith, competition rather than 
cooperation and science rathter than religion came to be 
accepted as the foundation stones. The noose of religion 
became a ritual and a formality. People became 
irreligioblS and lure for money became an obsession. The 
fear of the ultimate was eroded to a great measure, if 
not altogether. The one emotion that seemed to have 
unmistakably sabering effect on groups and individuals 
was this fear of ultimate the fear of what might happen 
to oneself, to one's near and dear, the fear of world 
beyond and the fear of the consequences generally. The 
psychology which kept andi maintained the stress on 
purity, resistance to temptation and the pur suit of 
goodness was increasingly abandoned in favour of money 
and material things. As if Renaissance, Reformation and 
Industrial Revolution were by themselves not enough, the 
American Revolution and the French Revolution came on 
their heels and raised a superstructure on the 
foundation laid down by their predecessors. There was a 
spate of revolutions all through out Europe and the 
entire social, economical and political structure of the 
free world underwent a veritable change. The whole world 
Bad shrunk due to technological and scientific advances 
and the advanced and speedly means of communications. 
People of different nations and different countries 
started coming into more frequent contact. These further 
precipitated the situation created by Industrial 
Revolution and Theory of Natural Rights. These added 
fuel to the fire. The new notion of 'doctrine of 
individual rights', propounded by Adam Smith in his 
Wealth of Nations (1776), had come to be accepted as 
basis of entire social, economical and political fabric. 
It was eulogized as the 'doctrine of natural rights'. 
The individual came to be recognised to posses certain 
inalienable and inviolable rights of life, liberty, 
property and trade. Any encroachment of these rights was 
considered not only morally wrong and economically 
unsound but also legally invi©lable and thus 
sacrosanct and laissez faire became the basis of entire 
government and trade. 
The states enacted some laws but with a view to 
collect taxes and augment their revenues rather than 
with a view to control or regulate and thus in the name 
of liberty of the individual and free trade and commerce 
all ethical, moral and healthy principles and standards 
continued to be violated with impunity and the state 
remained a passive on^looker. The state continued to 
function merely as a police state and the nations of 
social welfare or common good were yet(^ -far cry. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM :-
In the contemporary world the meaning and 
importance of strict liability attained new heights and 
dimensions. Today consumerism is an important 
manifestation of n>odus-vivendi where right to health 
and right to good environment got new impetus. Even 
Indian Judiciary shade a new tight in the 
interpretation of socio-economic offences. 
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ar;y f o r c e . 
The present study has been persuaded under this 
backdrop. This study examines the nature and meaning of 
strict liability under the existing socio-legal 
infrastructure and mechanism. 
Chapter I deals with meaning and nature of Socio-
economic crimes. Justifications for treating socio-
economic crimes differently from conventional crimes 
have also been discussed. This chapter also traces the 
historical development of the modern concept of strict 
liability. 
Chapter II examines the concept of "Public 
Welfare" and need for widening the concept of Public 
Welfare Offences. It also discussed strict liability 
with regard to Public Welfare Offences coupled with the 
classification of socio-economic offences. 
Chapter III evaluates strict liability in 
statutory offences having an eclipse of inen/i:^ , Srcs 
Moreover, various socio-economic legislations have also 
been given an anal—ytical treatment at length. Numerous 
models of strict liability have been put forward. 
Chapter IV discusses the burden of proof in strict 
liability offences, the presumption of innocence and 
shifting of the burden of proof. The same chapter also 
deals with areas where the element of mens rea is 
absent. The various pronouncements of the apex court 
have been analysed and pSrusued with the help of 
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judicial process and response. 
The conclusion and suggestions and recommendations 
have been submitted. 
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CHAPTER I 
CHAPTER I 
A. MEANING AND NATURE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRIMES 
Though all crimes are anti-social, all anti-social 
acts are not socio-economic crimes.Similarly all 
offences which affect the wealth of an individual victim 
do not constitute socio-economic crimes. Socio-economic 
crimes are those crimes which either affect the health 
and metarial welfare of the community as a whole or the 
countries economy, as against that of an individual 
victim, and by and large are committed not merely by low 
class people but invariably by the middle class and the 
elite of the community, most often during the course of 
their occupation e.g. trade, profession, commerce or 
business. Invariably, the motive of the criminal in such 
crimes is avarice or rapaciousness rather than hate or 
lust as in traditional crimes, and the background is 
non-emotional. 
The victim of such offenders, though quite often 
ostensibly an individual, is almost always the entire 
community of the state or a section of the public or 
community. Another essential ingredient of such crimes 
is that these are perpetrated through fraud rather than 
force and the act is deliberate and willfull. These are 
considered as a class by themselves, seperate from the 
traditional crimes, because their control involves the 
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protection and preservation of the general health and 
economic system of the entire society or nation against 
exploitation and waste and also the augumentation of the 
wealth of the country, by preservation and protection of 
the health and the wealth of the individuals.Socio-
economic crimes differ from traditional crimes also 
because they do not, to a common mind, involve or carry 
with them any stigma, while traditional crimes, unlike 
the socio-economic crimes have a symbolic meaning for 
the public and carry stigma involving a disgrace, a 
deprivity and an immorality and are thougth of as 
decidely the behaviour of the lower class of people. 
Socio-economic crimes involve a newer form of 
criminality, derived from the traditional criminality^. 
Ordinarily a mind at fault is necessary to 
constitute a crime.But there are some crimes which do 
not require any kind of legal"fault on the part of the 
accused. Crimes requiring fault on the part of some one, 
but the accused, in the crimes of vicarious liability 
and those not requiring fault on the part of anyone are 
known as crimes of strict liability. These are the 
crimes in which the necessity for mens rea or negligence 
is wholly or partly excluded'^ . 
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The meaning of strict liability is derived by 
opposing it to liability for fault. In problems reievent 
to criminal law. Strict liability means liability to 
punitive sanctions despite the lack, of mens rea^. 
There doesn't seem to be a crime of strict 
liability at common law. There doesn't also seem any 
statute that creates it in so many words. This question 
arises on the construction of a statute that penalises 
the conduct without express reference or with only a 
partial or limited reference to the mental state of the 
wrongdoer. The general principle of criminal 
jurisprudence is that although the statute is silent on 
the point, a requirement of mens rea is to be applied*^ . 
According to Kenny, some less complex and less 
guilty state of mind than the usual mens rea is 
sometimes by statutory enactment but hardly by the 
common law,made sufficient for the mental element in 
criminal guilt." 
The common law maxim actus non facit rettm nis^i 
mens sit rea, which so far had a strong impact in 
criminal jurisprudence seem to have been loosing the 
grip, with the advent of the doctrine of strict 
liability. The doctrine despences with requirement of 
ivBriB refi entirely in determining the criminal 
15 
resposibility of the accused. It is a product of literal 
interpretation of the statutes which give rise to what 
is called "Absolute prohibition" or "Absolute liability" 
or "Strict liability". In such cases an act is 
punishable if it falls within the words of statute, 
without any enquiry being made into the mental state of 
the wrongdoer. 
Such statutory offences are increasing both in 
number and importance. Yet they are rare. The 
legislature is averse to create these offences except 
where 
(i) The penality incurred is not great but, 
(ii) The damage caused to the public by the offence is 
in comparision with the penality, 
(iii) Where at the same time, the offence is such that 
there would usually be pecularity and difficulty 
in obtaining adequate evidence of the ordinary mens 
rea,if that degree of guilt were to be required. 
In all the civilised countries, there are laws 
which make an act criminal whether there is an 
intention to break the law or not. Their 
transgression are not criminal in the strict sense 
of the term but are civil in their nature and for 
special reasons are termed as offences. Thus, in 
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some of exceptional cases, less than the usual mens 
rea are sufficient. 
B. Justification for Treating Socio-Econoaic offences 
differently froa conventional crimes: 
These cases do not fit neatly in the accepted 
categories of crimes. They represent harm of greater 
magnitude than the traditional crimes and of a nature 
different from them. Unlike the traditional crimes, they 
are not in the shape of positive aggressions or 
invasions. The may not result indirect or immediate 
injury; nevertheless, they create a danger which, or the 
probability of which, the law must seek minimise. 
Whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the 
same. Hence, if legislation applicable to such offences, 
as a matter of policy, departs from legislation 
applicable to ordinary crimes in respect of the 
traditional requirements as to ihtins^ n--,,, and the other 
substantive matters as well as on points procedure, the 
departure would, we think, be justifiable. 
(C) MEHS REA AHD SOCIO-ECOHOMIC CRIMES: 
Under the traditionl criminal jurisprudence the 
criminal liability was incorporated in the well known 
common law maxim- a c LUB ;;,•..n f^^cji re^t,l: im-^x r,,^.. ~,, . 
rc-a, meaning that an act does not make one guilty unless 
there be guilty intention. Thus for imposing penal 
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liability two conditions must be satisfied, e.g. a 
wrongful act and a guilty mind. Both the conditions must 
be simultaneously satisfied. Thus mere doing of a wrong 
and prohibited act is not enough in itself to fix 
criminal liability,unless it is coupled with guilty 
mind. In case of traditionl offences,generally speaking, 
liability is not absolute and is rather related to the 
intention of the wrongdoer. 
However, with respect to socio-economic offences, 
the tendency of the legislature is to curtail the 
requirement of mens rea for criminal liability. The harm 
done by these offences are greater than that of 
traditionl crimes.They are graver than that of 
traditionl crimes. They affect the morality,health and 
welfare of the people as a whole and have a tendency to 
undermine the economic fabric. Therefore, the policy of 
the legislature in such cases is not to be lenient in 
the matter of their prevention,control and punishment 
and the wrongdoer is not allowed to escape unpunished. 
The policy can be implemented only if the penal 
liability in such cases is treated as strict e.g. 
without refrence to mens rea.However, the element of 
guilty mind is ever present in socio-economic offences 
but it is very difficult to prove it legally.While in 
1^  
such offences, actar. ) fu^-^ may be easily 
proved.Therefore,it is essential and necessary to 
formally exclude the requireiaent of mF.r>E^ re-d from the 
socio-economic offences.In such cases the burden of the 
prosecution is only to prove the actus reas and the 
burden of proving innocence lies on the accused. 
With refrence to socio-economic offences, the 
attitude of supreme court in relation to mens rea was 
that it is an essential ingredient of an offence. Nsthu 
Lsl V. state of «-P;1966 S.C.43.State of Mahsrashtra 
V. M,H, George,h.I.R 1965 S.C.722 and Mangaldas V. 
State of Maharashtra,A.I.R. 1966 S.C.128 
Doubtless, a statute may exclude the element of 
mens rea, but it is a sound rule of construction adopted 
in England and also accepted in India to construe a 
statutory provision creating an offence in conformity 
with the criminal law rather than against it, unless the 
statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded 
iTiGTiB rBa. The mere fact that the object of a statute is 
to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a great 
social evil is by itself not decisive of the question 
whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the 
ingredient of an offence. .^Jenx- red by necessary 
implication may be excluded by the statute only where it 
is absolutely clear that the implementation of the 
19 
object of the statute would otherwise be 
defeated.Thus,the courts proceed with initial 
presumption in favour of the need for mens rea but are 
prepared to dispense with mens rea if it is ascertained 
clearly or by necessary implication to be gathered from 
the language used by the legislature, object and 
purposes of the enactment. 
In order to control this criminality the 
punishment of imprisonment would be appropriate.This 
would have a deterrent effect on the offenders. 
Therefore,the legislature must provide sufficient and 
minimum imprisonment as punishment in statutes dealing 
with socio-economic offences.This minimum mandatory 
imprisonment would meet the ends of oust ice. 
In India the concept of socio-economic offences 
had already entered in criminal legal thought. Its 
present form is amorphous a graduate process of 
crystalisation has already started. The courts are not 
indifferent towards the problem thus in support and 
remembrance iif^B,V,G,K, Navalka (1958) 2M.LJ 308 the 
Supreme Court, accordance recognition to legislative 
consideration creating economic offences. Under the 
Foreign Rregulation Act 1947. But the observation of the 
court are quite relevent to offences under other socio-
2,0 
economic Statute which aim at the general upkeeps of 
nationl economic and financial intrest. Justice Mathew 
stated that the court has to ascribe a purpose to the 
statutory classification and coordinate the specific 
purpose under the law with the general purpose of the 
act as well as other relevant acts,including the public 
policies an approach would demand the consideration of 
public knowledge about the evil sought to be renedied, 
prior law. 
In India, several statutes have been passed by the 
union and state legislatures through which public 
welfare regulations are made effective. 
It will, therefore, be convenient to classify them 
under the following categories:-
(a) Sale 
(b) Possession 
(c) Traffic 
(d) Road 
(e> Prevention of Food and Adultration Act-1954. 
<f) The Drugs Act-1940. 
(g) The Suppression of Immoral Traffic tin 
women/girls) Act-1955 and offences relating to 
marriage (sections-493,498 of the Indian Penal 
Code.) 
(h> Indian Arms Act and Indian Explosives Act. 
&l 
Hence there are a large class of penal acts which are 
really not criminal but which are prohibitory by the 
levy of penality in the interest of the public. In such 
cases, the defendant must bring himself within the 
statutory defence. 
(D> RISE OF STRICT LIABILITY 
It is against this background that the rise of the 
moodern doctrine of strict liability must be viewed, 
where the accused can be convicted on the mere proof of 
actus reus only. The mental element is not to be 
considered in punishing a man. 
(a) Strict liability at CoBson Lav 
In common law crimes, a person can not be held 
criminally liable unless his can not be held criminally 
liable unless his conduct is accompanied by some blame-
worthy state of mind. 
There are very few common law offences of strict 
liability public nuisance, libel, blasphemy and contempt 
of court. 
A brief discussion of these offences will not be 
out of place. 
1. Public Nuisance 
A person may be vicariously liable, on a criminal 
^% 
charge , for a nuisance coirtirtitted by those under h i s 
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control although he did not know his existence .'"^  A 
public nuisance has been defined as an act not 
waranted by law, or the ojnission to discharge a legal 
duty, which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage 
to the public in the existence of rights to all her 
Majesty's Subjects,^® a section of the public aust be so 
affected. Typical examples are the obstruction of the 
high way or the emision of noice or smells from a 
factory in such a way as to cause inconvenience to the 
neighbourhood. 
2. Defanatory Libel 
This offence of means publication of defamatory 
matter in a permanent form concerning the individual or 
class of individuals, subject to the defences of 
justification (i.e., the truth of the publication), 
which is the public interest, and of absolute and 
qualified privile ge.^ An absolutely privileged 
publication includes a fair, accurate and 
contemporaneous report of judicial proceedings published 
in a news paper and parliamentary papers, while s 
publication has qualified privilege if, for instance, it 
is a report of parliamentary proceedings or a 
professional communication between solicitor and client. 
a.3 
In the law of torts, a person may, subject to a 
statutory defence, liable in defamation although he 
did not know that which he published applied to the 
plaintiff, as where, someone says that a couple are 
engaged, when unknown to him, the man is in fact married 
to a third person who complain that her reputation has 
been impgned. If, on such facts, a criminal 
prosecution would be successful, the case would 
undoubtedly be one of strict liability, but there is no 
decision directly covering this point. 
3. Blaspheny 
This offence is committed if a person publishes in 
a permanent form any matter attacking the christian 
doctrine or the Bible, or the doctrine of the church of 
England, or God, Christ or other sacred persons, 
provided that the material is calculated to outrage. 
Christians religious feelings.-^* The accused must have 
intended to publish the material which was in fact 
blasphemous. But in Lemon, the House of Lords held, by 
a majority, that an intention to out rage and insult 
christian believers is not required, so that despite the 
denial of the majority, the offence is one of strict 
liability to this extent.^^ 
2,4-
4. Crininal conteapt of court 
In some areas of the law of contempts particularly 
as it affects the press, liability does not for the laost 
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part depend upon the proof of know of intent. 
Some writers also included obscentity in this 
list. Thus these five, are considered as exceptions to 
the general requirement of .weni- rea at common law; but 
how far this is true has never been altogether clear. 
Blasphemy and obsenity are of the strict liability in 
respect of the judgement of what is blasphemous or 
obscene, but the judgement is very close to being a 
value .... judgement rather than a question of ta.ct.° 
It is arguable that criminal libel requires .'ftp/r---. , f ,-., 
except in respect of the judgement of what is 
defamatory, and except also that an employer is 
attributively liable for a publication by his 
employee. •^•^  Libel has been turned by statute into a 
crime of negiigene in some cases. Contempt of court was 
perhaps a crime of strict liability in certain respects 
* -I 20 of common law,"^ 
This English rule is affirmed with modifications 
in the contempt of court Act 1981, SSi?.^! Public 
nuisance can apparently be committed by negligence, and 
is a crime of strict liability to the extent it carries 
2S 
attributive liability, which it does in at least some 
cases, but it has lost much of its importance because 
indictments are uncommon. 
(E) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMEHT OF DOCTRINE OF STRICT 
LIABILITY : 
In the ancient times the man was presumed to 
extend all the concequences of his act. No regard was 
paid to the circumstances attending the occurence or the 
mental innocence of the accused, this may be said to be 
the doctrine of strict liability in its traditional 
forms. The doctrine applied with equal force to public 
law and private law both. As the days relied on legal 
intelligentia began to doubt the inherient efficiency 
and the universality of the dictum. Very soon it became 
evident that the doctrine of strict liability couldn t 
be applied in all the circumstances equally. This period 
of development of criminal legal though concided with 
the emergence of significance of the mental element in 
crime. The superiority, or the monopoly of the physical 
element was suffered to die a natural death. The mental 
element comes after with the physical one. It is at this 
stage of development that the criminal thinking comes to 
recognise both physical as well as mental element fictus 
non fscit r&um nisi mens sit rea. 
as 
Historically speaking mens rea has occupied prominent 
place in common law and criminal jurisprudence. 
However, the aforementioned maxim had to face big 
question mark with the emergence of the positive state 
in twenteenth century in contrast with police state of 
the preceeding century. Along with this transformation 
state began to feel its responsibility for many acts of 
its instrumentalities effecting the individuals to his 
disadvantages.With the above mention transformation of 
individualistic state is clearly connected with another 
transformation, namely, the transformation from a 
ruralistic to an industrialised or urbanised society. 
The rape of earth overgrazing, waste of water, impurity, 
insanitation, adultrat ion in food and drugs and a 
multitude of over matter may be cited" . 
While dealing with these offences it was felt that 
strict adherence to the traditional maxim of aiztus rion 
facit reum nisi mens sit rea was doing inconcievable 
injury to the social and economic health of the nation. 
By and large seprate statute began to come up for 
tackling the new (economic) crimes. Presently the 
position is that the whole new area of criminal law has 
come out as a result of such legislation with reference 
to such statutes and offences there under and it came to 
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be realized that diluting of the //>c,,3 r. r, was the only 
remedy. In other words, resort to strict liability 
doctrine, once again, became the need of the day. 
"This development," according to Sayer "is not the 
unnatural result of two pronounced movements which mark 
the twenteenth century criminal administration e.g. 
(i> The shift of emphasis from the protection of the 
individual interest which marked the ninteenth century 
criminal administration to the protection of public and 
social interest, 
(ii) And the growing utilization of the criminal law 
machinary to enforce not only the true crimes of the 
classic law, but a new type of twenteenth century 
regulatory measures involving no moral deliquency . 
(F) STRICT LIABILITY AND CRIMES: 
To others, the new category of offences are 
offences of strict liability, but again it is hardly a 
complete description of this new category of offences 
because these also include offences where the necessity 
of mens rea is only partially excluded. To call these as 
regulatory offences is similarly not appropriate because 
these offences involve certain offences in which there 
is absolute prohibition and not mere regulations. 
2,1 
Glanville Miiliams"^ , has reffered to criines 
requiring mf^ns re,.,, crimes that can be comffiitted by 
negligence and criiaes that do not require any kind of 
legal fault. It is third category of crimes which he has 
called crimes of strict liability or absolute 
prohibition and according to him the necessity of mens 
rea or negligence is wholly or partly excluded therein, 
but legal history has recognized such third category 
crimesfrom the earliest times in cases of constructive 
murder, manslaughter and it was not until the later part 
of the nineteenth century that strict responsibility 
came, to be revived on a large scale through the literal 
construction of acts of parliament and other 
legislations . 
Even Williams has recognized in the context of 
"Public Welfare Offences" or "Regulatory Offences" that 
to use these expressions is easier than to say exactly 
what they mean. Ail crimes are, in a sense, public 
welfare offences. The chief crimes that appear to have 
come with in the narrow meaning of this phrase in 
England are, the sale, etc of certain articles of 
inferior quality or at excessive prices, and certain 
acts incidental there to, keeping unlicenced mental 
homes, possessing fictitious stamps, failing to provide 
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safe conditions of work, and certain offences connected 
with road traffic. There is no gurantee that this list 
is exhaustive, for the courts may add to it at any 
time^^'. This view is, if at all, only reinforced from 
what Hall, the noted American jurist has observed. 
According to Hall, "The meaning of strict liability is 
derived by opposing it to liability for fault. In 
problems relevent to criminal law, strict liability 
means liability to punitive sanctions, despite lack of 
Thus strict liability is an element of criminal 
law rather than of only a special category of offences 
and the mere fact that it is more prominent and 
pronounced in the context of socio-economic offences 
would not enable us to label these offences only as the 
strict liability offences.According to Hall himself the 
decisions set the foundations of strict liability which, 
starting as a minor aberration that was tolerated 
because it involved only right sanctions has since 
become a mighty structure whose effects, though hardly 
known, must certainly be very great.... strict liability 
has expanded so considerably in recent years and in such 
various forms, that it is impossible to generalise 
regarding"^^ it. In the context of public welfare 
offences Hall has observed that 'quite apart from the 
Q^ 
diverse uajor criae that have been brought with in this 
sphere.'It is difficult to recognise coamon features in 
the so called public welfare offences. 
First,Many of the enactments apply not to the 
general public but only to certain traders, particularly 
to suppliers of food or drugs and vendors of alcoholic 
beverages. Others, having ©ore general applications as 
to potential offenders, are restricted to very few 
activities.... the operation of autoaiobiles, safety of 
highways, hunting, fishing and various health measures. 
Hext, many of these regulations and the conditions of 
confirming to them presuppose continuous activity, such 
as carrying on a business. This implies that general 
standards regarding such conduct are important rather 
than isolated acts. Third, the public welfare enactments 
to an intricate economy, including an impersonal market. 
Although analogous to control dates at least from the 
gilds, violation under condition of trade prevailing in 
primary groups are more readily recognised as immoral. 
Then, fourth, the modern regulations are not strongly 
supported by mores era. There observence doesn't arose 
the resentment directed at the perpetrators of 
traditional crimes*^ .^ 
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We may consider the matter in which ever context 
we might like, it would not be proper to call the 
offences of this newer forms of criminality either as 
strict liability offences or Public Welfare Offences or 
Regulatory offences or even White Collor Offences. Such 
a discription would be inchoate, incomplete and faulty; 
rather, considering that these offences are born mainly 
of the trade, profession or business and always involve 
an element of money and also considering that in course 
of time these have engulfed the entire elite of the 
society would not admit of any other no men culture to 
correspond properly to these offences. Even otherwise 
the term of socio-economic crimes is an all embracing 
term and has widest possible connotation so as to 
include in it all economic offences, be they committed 
by traders, manufacturers or businessmen or by men in 
professions or men in public service and other position 
of authority, or other persons belonging to the middle 
class or elite class of the socity^^. 
Similarly it is wide enough to include all 
offences, whether calculated to prevent or obstraot 
economic development of the country and endanger its 
economic health, or misuse of their position by public 
servants in making of contacts and disposal of public 
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property, or issue of licences and permits and similar 
other matters, or delivery by individuals and industrial 
and commercial undertaking of goods not in accordence 
with agreed specifications in fulfilment of contracts 
entered into with public authorities,or profiteering, 
black marketing and hoarding, or adultration of food 
stuffs and drugs, or theft and misappropriation of 
public property and funds, or trafficking in licences 
and permits, or smuggling and violation of foreign 
exchange regulation, under - invoicing and over-
invoicing, or violation of standards, weights and 
measures, or malpractices incorporate companies of 
share pushing, administration and frauds, or 
professional misconducts, or bribery and corruption of 
public servents and other persons in authority^"^. 
All these aberrations are born of greed, avarice 
and repaciousness and are a peculiar feature of persons 
of responsibility and high social status in an 
acquisitive and affluent society, and they all affect not 
only the health and material welfare of the individuals, 
but also the economic structure and social fabric of a 
nation. Like wise, they are all committed in the course 
of one's trade, business or profession and deliberately 
and wilfully without any emotional background or mens 
rea. The term socio-economic crimes covers a wider 
aa 
spectrum and would include Sill public welfare offences 
Regulatory offences and White Collor Crimes . 
?\4. 
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CHAPTER H 
CHAPTER II 
(A) CONCEPT OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
The contemporary state is a transition from police 
state to welfare state. The concept of public welfare 
gystemsfrom the doctrine of Welfare state where state is 
responsible for the good of the people. In every set-up 
of governnance it is the good of the people which sets 
an agenda of betterment and empowerment of the people at 
large by the governing dispensation. 
The socio-economic offences, affecting as the/ do 
the hea 1th and wealth of the entire community, require 
to be put down with a heavy hand at a time when the 
country has embarked upon a gigantic process of social 
and economic planning. With its vastnes m size, its 
magnitude of problems and its long history of poverty 
and subjugation, our welfare state needs weaporis of 
attack on poverty, ill nourishment, and exploitation 
that are sharp and effective in contrast with the 
weapons intended to repress other evils. The legislative 
armoury for fighting socio-economic crimes, therefore, 
should be furnished with weapons which may not be needed 
for fighting ordinary crimes. The damage offences to a 
developing society could be treated on a level different 
from ordinary crimes. In a sense, anti-social activities 
^7 
in the nature of deliberate and persitent vioiataons of 
economic laws could be described as extra-hazardous 
activities and it is in this light that we approach the 
problem. 
Since the casualty is the nation's welfare, it is 
these offences which really deserve the name of Public 
2 Welfare' Offences. 
Long ago, Sayre' cited and classified a large 
number of cases of "Publlic Welfare Offences' and 
concluded that they fall roughly into Subdivisions of 
('. ) illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of 
impure or adulterated food and drugs (3) Sale of 
misbranded articlles, (4) violations of antinarcotic 
Acts, (5) Criminal nuisances, (6) Violations of Traffic 
Regul a-tions, (7) Violations of motor-vehicles laws, and 
(8) violations of general police regulations, passed for 
the safety health or well-being of the community." 
<B) NEED FOR WIDEEMING THE COONCEPT OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
OFFENCES 
The time has come when the concept of"Public 
Welfare Offences' should be given a new dimension and 
extended to cover activities that affect national health 
or wealth on a big scale. Demand of the economic 
prosperity of the nation have brought into being risks 
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of a volume and variety unheard of, and if those 
concerned with the transactions and activities in this 
field were not to observe new standards of care and 
conduct, vital damage will be caused to the public 
welfare. In the field of health. For example, the wide 
distribution of goods has become an instrument of wide 
distribution of harm. When those who disperse food, 
drink and drugs, do not comply with the prescribed 
standard of quality. Integrity disclosure and care, 
public welfare receives a vital blow. In the economic 
field, again, freshly discovered source of harm require 
the imposition of a higher type of precautions, without 
which there would be vital damage to the fabric of the 
n 
country and even to its very survival. 
(C) PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENCES AND STRICT LIABILITY: 
In modern times the principle of strict 
resposibility is more noticeable in 'Public Welfare 
Offences'. Public welfare offences are statutory 
offences of minor character involving minor punishment. 
They are offences connected with sale of adultrated food 
or drugs or offences of possession or offences connected 
with road traffic or offences against customer's Rules 
and Foreign Regulations. 
^9 
There is a presumption that doctrine of mens rea 
applies to all crimes including statutory crimes. But 
this presumption is liable to be displaced either by the 
words of the statute. Creating the offence or by the 
subject-another with which deals and both must be 
considered fSherras v/s De-Rutzen (1895)^. 
In England under the title Public Welfare 
Offences'. Williams, G .; has included the offences 
relating to sale etc. of certain articles of inferior 
quality or at excessive prices and certain acts 
incidental there to, keeping unlicenced mental houses, 
possessing fictious stamps, failing to provide safe 
conditions of work and certain offences connected with 
road traffic- However, he has conceded that this list is 
not exhaustive. 
More than hundred years ago an English court held 
a retail dealer guilty of having adultrated tobocco in 
his possession despite the fact that he had purchase it 
in the regular course of thatand neither know nor had 
any reason to suspect that if was adultrated. The 
statute on which the procecution was brought recited the 
common practice of using substitutes. It said nothing 
about knowledge or intent to adultrate the product or 
even negligence in discovering the adultration-
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Hence it is significant that m reversing the 
dismissal of the procecution by the Magistrate m Re'g v, 
ftfocdrow. Pollock,C^J, said, "So you are wilfully 
disob^ng the Act of Parliament, if you do not take due 
pains to examine the article which you deal ." It being 
noted that this "might require a nice chemical 
a 
analysis " he replied that it must get someone to make 
that nice chemical analysis is conducted. 
The defendant was bound to take care 3n 
reality a prudent man who conduct this business will 
9 
take care to guard against the injury of complament . 
Deron Parion added, it is very true that m particular 
instances an innocent person may suffer from his want of 
care is not examining the tobocco but the public 
convmence would be much greater, if in every case the 
officers were obliged to prove knowledge. They would be 
very seldom at least to do so. The lagislature have 
clearly made it m plain wrongs . 
A few years later, a Massachusetts Court upheld a 
conviction for selling adultrated milk although, again 
the defendent was not at fault. The court emphasised the 
language of the statute the fact that the penality was a 
fine : the impracticability of requiring proof of 
knowledge, the importance of protecting the community 
1^ 
against the common aduitration of food : and the 
reasonableness of imposing the risk upon the dealer and 
thus holding him "absolutely liable ." {Cammon i>iesiltr, 
V, Ferrer) 9i Mass JSt>4) These decisions set the 
foundations of strict liability which starting as a 
minor aberration that was liberated because it involved 
only slight sanctions has become mighty structure whose 
effects must be great. There is nothing that need shock 
of any kind in the payment of a small pecunary penality 
by a person who has done reluctantly something 
detrimental to the public interest ( Wills ) in Reg v, 
12 TolBon . The supporting arguments have continued 
precisely to be those enunicated m the above early 
cases. 
The history of this body of case law reveals 
considerable reluctance on the judges part to concede 
the irreievencB of mens rea and to engage in dubious 
dogmatics distinguishing " Civil Penalities" from 
punitive sanctions and "Public Wrong" from crimes- Thus 
a century after Woodrow, Wrighty J m q u a s h m g a 
conviction for preffering liquor to a Constable on duty 
observed. It is claim that if mens rea is not necessary, 
no care on the part of the constable could save him from 
conviction {Stierras- V, D^Rutzen ie^S^^^') .But with rare 
exceptions which definitely established that mens rea. is 
4a 
not essential in public welfare offences, indeed that 
exceptions has a very high degree of care is 
irrelevent. The fact of the Sheras5 V/B Rut2en are as 
follows : "On July 16,1895 the police constable in 
question, being on duty entered the appellant's house 
and was served with liquor by the appi11 ant's daughter 
in his persence. Prior to entering the house police 
constable had removed his armlet and it was admitted 
that if a police constable is not wearing his armlet, 
that is an indication that he is off duty. He was a 
frequent visitor to the appellent's house.Neither the 
appellent nor his daughter made any inquiry of the 
police constable as to whether he was or was not on dut/ 
but they took it for granted that he was off duty in 
consequence of his armlet being off,and served him with 
liquor under the belief.The appellant was prosecuted 
under section 16(2) of the licenceing Act, 1872 for 
having unlawfully supplied liquor to a police constable 
on duty without the authority of a superior officer of 
such constable." 
Thus a seller of a cattle feed was convicted of 
violating a statute forbidding misrepresentation of the 
percentage of oil in the product, despite the fact that 
he had employed a reputable chemist to make the analysis 
4^ 
and had even understood the chemist -findings. The 
limitations that might have been inferred from the 
remarks of Pollock. C.J. m Woodrow words ignored 
Alverstone.C.J. only remarked ; This is a hard 
case {Lsrid V- ItoboJi l^B^}-^"^. 
So too it has been held that butcher who 
innocently and without negligence sold meat of a dead 
animal violated the statute and that the provision for 
imprisonment as are one of the sanctions didn't alter 
the irrelevance of mens rea . It was suggested that if 
it required an expert to discover latent imperfections 
one who engaes m the meat business must mcure that 
expense although seen above, liability might be 
imposed nonethless 
In the United States, there has been a great 
accumulation of authority, following the early 
Massachusetts case noted earlier, including and beyond 
an important Supreme Court decision holding a corporate 
officer guilty of shipping adultrated food m the inter 
state commerce, although he had no knowledge of the 
facts : Was not guilty of any fault whatever, and so far 
as appeared, operated his business in a skillfull and 
careful 1 manner"^ . {United StsteB V- Dstter fc'aich 320 
Strict liability has expanded so considerably in 
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recent years m such various forms that it is impossible 
to have a generalization regarding it. Quite apart from 
the diverse major crimes that have been brought with m 
this sphere, it is difficult to recognize the common 
features in the so called public welfare offences. These 
includes e.g. the sale of narcotics, the sale of 
adultrated food, the possession of transportation of 
gambling devices, the transportation of intoxicating 
liquors, the sale of liquors to habitual drunkards, 
traffic offences, rotations of buildings regulations and 
a great additional miscellany that can hardly be placed 
m any classification. The penality is generally small 
but that is also true for violation of statutes cind 
regulations which are not subjected to strict liability. 
Despite this divergence, it is possible to hazard 
certain mere significant generalizations regarding 
public welfare offences. 
First ; Many of the enactments apply not to the 
general public but only to certain traders, particularly 
to suppliers of food or drugs and vendors of alcoholic 
beverages. Others having more general applications as to 
potential offenders are restricted to very few 
activities the operation of automobiles, safety of 
highways, hunting, fishing, and various health measurts. 
^5 
Next may be of those regulations and conditions of 
confirming to them presuppose a continuous activity such 
as carrying on a business. This implies that general 
standards regarding such conduct are important rather 
than isolated acts. Third, the public welfare 
enactments are relatively low. They represent 
relatively recent adoptations to an intricate ecDnomv/ 
including an impersonal market. Although analogous 
control dates at least from the guilds, violation under 
conditions of trade prevailing m primary groups are 
more readily recognized as immoral. Then fourth, the 
modern regulations are not strongly supported by the.-.. 
verses. Their occurence don't arose the resentment 
directed at the prepration of traditional crimes. 
Accordingly, although Ross Alequnt denunciation of food 
adultrators may have much merit it arises at little 
convictions because sustaining mores BVB lacking. The 
above common attributes of large segments of the minor 
offences which are subjected to strict liability 
indicates that this law was constructed to meet, now, 
important social problems, they also help us to 
understand now strict liability came to be accepted, but 
they do not prove any justification of penal liability 
at the recent time 
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CHAPTER HI 
CHAPTER III 
A. STRICT LIABILITY IH STATUTORY OFFEHCES: ECLIPSE OF 
MENS FIE A 
In England, the common law doctrine of >>•.'-
was not taken into consideration in many statutory 
offences. Several justifications have been advanced for 
this departure from the classical principle. 
Generally speaking, these statutes do not require 
mental element for the conviction of the ac oused. This 
statement was made by Dr. Stally brass in his article 
"Ec;Jips-iG- of i-ter/s /ea" in 1936. It indicates that the 
general doctrine of mens res suffered a temporary 
eclipse, because in many statutory offences it was not 
required. 
The starting of Strict Liability is said^ to be 
the English case of Woodraw^ where a licensed tobacco 
dealer was convicted of having adulterated tobacco in 
his possession even though it was proved that the 
tobacco had been adulterated in the course of 
manufacture and that the dealer who bought it in good 
faith neither knew nor had any reason to suspect the 
adulteration. 
Comtemporaneously but independently the same 
judicial attitude towards statutory offences of 
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regulatory nature developed in U.S.A. also. Sayre says. 
that the - American development starts with Barnes V. 
State in which it was held that the offences of selling 
liquor to a common drunkard was committed even if the 
seller did not know that the buyer was a common 
drunkard. 
The Strict liability at this stage was generally-
found in what may be called "moral crimes". Such as 
bigamy, adultry and statutory rape, etc. Thus, a man may 
be convicted for bigamy although he reasonably but 
mistakenly believes his first wife to be dead, the 
defendant can be convicted of adultry although he might 
reasonably believe that he is having sexual relations 
with an unmarried woman. 
In the latter half of the 19th century the policy 
of legislature in England moved towards a more minute 
regulation of social life by the creation of many non-
indicatable offences carrying a relatively light 
punishment and defined in the statutes with greater 
emphasis than had formerly been the practice. The result 
was that the courts were more inclined to have regard 
solely to the wards of the statute without importing the 
common law requirement of ^IK-;,:- ,-r.-,. This development it 
absolutely clear in RV Prince I in which the accused 
reasonably believing her to be over the age of 16 years 
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had taken a girl who was infact below that age out of 
the possession and against the will of her father. His 
conviction was upheld. 
In 1899 a man was held liable for selling 
adulterated milk although the adulteration had been 
affected, by a dishonest strange against whose acts he 
had no means of profe ting himself. 
In a little over a century this new doctrine that 
rri€.ri-- /-eii forms no part of the definition of a regulatory 
offence, has gone from strength to strength. At the 
present day it embraces a vast area of law of immediate 
concern to almost every member of the community capable 
of incurring criminal responsibility. 
The draftsmen of American law Institutes Model 
Penal Code, merely by way of giving "some indication of 
the range" of Strict liability in the modern times, 
cite cases from the U.S.A., England, Canada and 
Australia to illustrate forty-two district types of 
offences within its scope. A depth study of Wisconsin m 
12 195fc revealed that of 1,113 statutes creating criminal 
offences which were mforce m 1953, no less than 660 
used language in the definitions of the offences which 
omitted all reference to a mental element, and which 
therefore, under the canons of construction which have 
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come to govern these matters, left it open to the courts 
to impose Strict liability if they saw fit. The 
Wisconsin study also shows that the greatest extent of 
language omitting ail references to a mental element m 
the definitions of offences was found in areas of 
administrative regulations of society in which modern 
legislature enacts a lot of laws. Such a concentration 
is found at the tension points of modern society, 
Business regulations, health and safety and conservation 
of resources for planned features-
Sayre pointed out that since liability arose iri 
the context of certain social conditions it was 
therefore justified by those conditions. The decisions 
permitting convictions of light police offences without 
proof of a guilty mind came at the time when the demands 
of an increasingly complex social order required 
additional regulations of an administrative character 
unrelated to the questions of personal guilt. At the 
same time there was amove away from individualism to 
col leetivism. 
Prof- Sayre rightly remarked that "the interesting 
fact that the same development took place m both 
England and the United States at about the same time 
strongly indicates that the movement has not been merely 
an historical accident but the result of the changing 
5"! 
social conditions and beliefs of the day". 
Dean Roscoe Pound was of the view that Strict 
liability for regulatory offence is based on "the social 
interest in the general security". He also stated, 
"The good sense of courts has introduced a doctrine of 
acting at one's peril with respect to statutory crimes 
14 
which expresses the needs of society". 
B. INCORPORATION OF STRICT LIABILITY UNDER SOCIO-
ECONOMIC OFFENCES 
The principle of strict liability has been 
embodied in various kind of socio-economic offences. The 
very nature of crime has given rise to this principle. 
One reason which can be conveniently ascribed to this 
fact is that the socio-economic offences are new form of 
criminality in which upper and middle class people are 
involved and is committed by them m the course of their 
occupation, BanthBr }r:-y!in' has named these crimes as "White 
Col lor Crimes". These offences are often been described 
as Public Welfare Offences, Regulatory Offences and 
Crime Of Strict Liability. Under such crime the welfare 
of public and social fabric society generally remains at 
stake- This form of criminality has spreaded all over 
the world m different degrees. The incidence and 
magnitude of such offences is much greater m developed 
sa 
countries than m developing countries. Even the under 
developed countries are not free from this rea-
Traditional crimes have been a parrel lei phenomena 
since the dawn of human civilisation. Scientific and 
technological advancement has accelerated the pace of 
this new form of criminality commonly known as socio-
Bconomic offences.In other words one can say that socio-
economic criminality is the product of industrial 
revolution. Nevertheless renaissance and reformation 
also have contributed to the emergence of these crimes. 
The fear of God was lessened in favour of money and 
material things. The strive for a better standard of 
life, gradually given rise to new pattern of 
criminality. The ethics and moral values were thrown 
away m pursuit of money and all kinds of frauds, 
misrepresentation came to be committed by the people m 
the course of their trade, commerce, business and 
profession. The theory of natural right and poliLy/ of 
iaj^ .GV lr\irc restrained the state from interfering m 
the material pursuits of the individual. Consequently 
this new criminality multiplied many times and 
indulged the whole world. 
'Socio-economic offences' can be conveniently be 
defined i. as those crimes which either affect the 
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health and material welfare of the community as a whole 
or the country's economy. These am committed not by 
low class people but invariably the middle class and the 
elite of the community, most often during the course of 
their occupation e.g. trade, profession, commerce, or 
business. It seems desirable here to have brovjsing 
through the characteristic features of this type of 
crime. These are enumerated hereunder; 
(i) The sociD-BCDnomic offences are considered grave 
wrong than traditional offences because they affect 
not only the health and material welfare of the 
individual but also the economic structure and 
social fabric of a nation, 
(ii) Unlike traditional offences, socio-economic offences 
are committed by middle class and upper class people 
of the society in the course of their trade, 
business or profession. 
(iii) In traditional offences,the motive behind the 
commission of such offences are hate or lust etc., 
while in socio-economic offences the motive is 
greed for money-
(iv) Socio-economic offences are committed by way of 
fraud, misrepresentation etc., rather than force and 
the act is deliberate and wilful 1.Thus socio-
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economic offences are not committed by emotions, 
(v) Traditional offences are out come of guilty or 
criminal mind while socio-economic offences ars 
the product of corrupt mmd-Thus corruption is the 
root cause of this new criminality-
(vi) In reference to a common man, socio-economiL 
offences do not carry with them any stigma.On the 
other hand the traditional offences are considered 
carrying stigma involving disgrace and immorality. 
The characteristic features alongwith the compare 
and contrast with that of traditional crime leads us to 
comprehend various categories of offences- The authors 
have expressed near unanimity regarding these broad 
heads under which the socio-economic offences can be 
studied from the view point of strict liability. Thus it 
foilows: 
(i) Evasion and avoidance of lawfully imposed tax. 
(ii) Adultration of food stuffs, drugs and cosmetics, 
(ill) Racketeering, profiteering,black marketing and 
hoarding. 
(iv) Bootlegging and violations of anti-narcotic 
legislations, 
(v) Smuggling, under-invoicing,over-invoicmg and 
violations of other foreign exchange regulations. 
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(vi) Violations of standards, weights and measures, 
(vii) Violations of rationing and guest control orders, 
(viii) Trafficking m licenses, permits and quotas, 
(ix) Embezzlement, misappropriation and frauds and 
other malpractices including sharepushing, 
monopolistic controls in the administration of 
corporate and other bodies, 
(x) Bribery, corruption,favouratism and nepotism ID 
public ser\/ices and by persons m high authority, 
(xi) Violations of specifications in public Property and 
theft, misappropriation and frauds relating public 
property. 
1x11) Profession! misconduct and; 
(xiii) Other miscellaneous offences calculated to prevent 
or obstruct the economic development of the country 
and endanger its economic health. 
C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEGISLATIONS IN INDIA 
The origin and development of socio-economic 
offences in India dates back to 1947. At the time of 
independence the country was gripped with many problems. 
As a natural sequal to this the planned development 
started in order to fulfill the requirement of the 
people as given m the preamble of our Constitution. The 
post independent India soon realised the need to revamp 
5'S 
criminal law and criminal justice system. Indian Penal 
Code of late learnt not to be of much use due to rise of 
socio-economic crimes. It necessitated for masive 
codification and legislative endeavours. Some of the 
prominent legislations are described hereunder; (1) The 
(1) Drugs Control Act 1940. 
(2) The Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. 
(3) The Dangerous Drugs Act 1954 
(4) The Essential Commodities Act 1955. 
(5) The Arms Act 1969. 
(8) The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973. 
(7> The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention 
of Smuggling Activities Act 1974. 
(8) The Preventive Detention Act 1980. 
An analysis of the socio-economic legislations 
along with the case-law has been undertaken. Some of 
important laws on the subject has been delineated in the 
pages to follow: 
1. The Drugs Act 1940 
In Indian Process of ChBmicsl Lsbaratory V, Drug 
In^pector^ Msdras,^^ the accused were held liable under 
section 18(a)(i> if the Drugs Act for having supplied 
tincture Digitalis of a sub standard quality,meant for 
patients suffering heart attacks. Rama Swami J.who 
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delivered the judgeinent in appeal observed. 
As the object of the statute in creating strict 
liability is an imprative one under the said 
section, intention to do the prohibited act 
which is made penal by the statute is not 
required. 
In an other case where the charges against a 
person dealing in drugs were that he had (Olive oil) 
which on testing and analysing was found to certain 
arches oil. The person had sold the misbranded drug with 
botles of olive oil representing them to certain olive 
oil of medicinal quality. He was held guilty under 
section 27 of the Drugs Act for heaving contravened 
statutory prohibitions. 
2. THE PREVEHTIOH OF FOOD ADULTRATIOH ACT 1954 
The social purpose of the prevention of Food 
Adultration Act is the elimination or dilution of the 
requirement of nicn.^ re,?.,, which is otherwise the corner 
stone of criminal jurisprudence. For imposing strict 
liability for the act done is a device used for quite 
sometime - in the area of legislation aimed at fighting 
the wrong jeoparding public welfare. 
The justification for prefering strict liability 
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to /'/i:r,T- rt.-r, in cases of food adultration is well 
understood in terms of support being lent to the society 
infighting that menace which has been threating the 
health of the nation. THe legality for such an attitude 
rests on the fact that the antisocial and anti-national 
conduct fraudulently selling stuff seems to breed 
mistrust among the citizens and to that extent it tends 
to weaken democracy governed by the rule of law. ° It 
appears that the courts are much inclined to enforce the 
provisions of the Food Adultration Act effectively. In 
1 Q 
'jiacK V. t-i:.r}iou2\cr-^^ the accused was prosecuted and 
convicted by the Magistrate for selling aduitrated milk 
to the food Inspector, Surat. 
Similarly, where, the accused, a wholesale 
merchant had stored adulterated and misbranded bags of 
paper and had been labelled to show the standard of 
quality of paper. All the bags bore the name of the city 
Calcutta and from these facts, it could be presumed, 
that the accused who had admittedly been an exportor had 
packed paper, for purpose of exporting it to Calcutta, 
in the course of sale. The accused did not produce any 
evidence to rebut the presumption, and even when 
questioned at the trial, he did not say that the paper 
was kept for garbling and not for sale. It was held that 
the said paper was meant for sale. For it is 
5"9 
essentially, the sale of adultrated food that the act 
seeks to prevent and for the purpose of making effective 
provision to the end, it not merely prohibits the acts 
of sale but also manufacture, storage and distribution; 
leading to Sale. 
In Food Inspector koshi Kods V- V^F, kum^r.'^" It 
was held that the purchases even it be for a purpose of 
analysis, does not cease to be a sale and that the 
accused did sale adultrated tea to the food Inspector, 
who paid for the samples, purchased by him. 
The Supreme CJourt has further expanded law, 
relating to adulterated Food. In M-V- Joshi V, V-^^V, 
Sxmps.,'^^ where the quality or purity of Butter fell 
below the standard prescribed by the rule amounted to 
adulteration within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. 
If the prescribed standard is not attained, the statute 
treats such butter by fiction as an adultrated food, 
though in fact it is not adultrated. 
In yet another case, Sschindan y, JJistt Boards 
Mxdnapur,^^ the accused was convicted merely for taking 
delivery consignment of adulterated mustard oil, at the 
railway station for the purpose of selling it, even 
though he never had opportunity of examing them. It wa.s 
held that the moment the person took delivery of the 
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goods, it was understood to have been stored for sale. 
Yet entirely different type of circumstances also lead 
to conviction in offences relating to sale. 
It was held in .-/r?--/"/;;-•.-f='- that the substance 
adultrated need not be poisonous or injurious as the 
object of the Act is to the that the substance sold is 
not mixed with any after thing, prohibited by law. Hence 
the plea that the adultration was not prejudicial to 
health but only added to appear more attractive to the 
buyer could not be substained. 
Generally, it is taken to mean that the article 
when, on analysis; is found below the prescribed 
specifications, the quality or purity of the article 
would naturally come below the prescribfed standard 
within the meaning of S.2(l) of Food Adultration Act 
1954. 
In case of Pslghat Muncipal ±ty v', S-R, Mzll 3^<Z 
the court has incorporated the newer approach in dealing 
with socio-economic offences in as much as it has 
reterated the need to understand the object of the Act 
through the external aid like bill etc. And to adopt 
such meaning of the law as would be beneficial to the 
intention of the legislation in furthance of its object 
rather than to depend upon technicalities which may 
frustrate the legislative attempt to the advantages of 
ei 
socio-economic offender. Justice Filial, has 
effjphatically pointed out the need for establishing a oo-
relationship between the duties of the businessman and 
the rights of the consumer, who is always the victioi in 
case of socio-economic clamities. 
He has observed thus:-
There are several rights, such as rights to 
' safety, right to be heard right to know, and 
right to fair agreement evolved in 
consumerism. 
Further according to him: 
The most important rights in consumerism is the 
right to safety and in our country it was 
recognised in the Prevention of Food Adultration 
Act.24 
Then the problem as to how to balance the 
newer right with the older concept which govern the 
liability in criminal cases. A blind adherence to 
the strict liability doctrine may lead to unjust 
results. Therefore, the courts have adopted a policy 
of bifurcating the issue of liability into the 
spheres two spheres. 
(i> Where culpability can be fastened on the basis 
of strict liability even though the absence of 
sz 
,-,iF,i- y h ^^ is completely established, and 
(ii) Even though the strict liability nay be 
fastned, the penal liability to negatived. 
Thus in ^-C- Pannami V. State of Maharashtra^^ 
the appellants had purchased food article from 
a licence manufacturer which was found to 
adulterated and held guilty accordingly. As a 
defence he pleaded that he was merely 
distributing the eatables which was originally 
purchased by the licence manufacturer so as 
enable him to escape liability. But appellant 
failed in his contention. The Supreme Court did 
not relax the standard of strict liability. 
The court observed: 
If a vendor would be permitted to have a defence 
by stating that the vendor, purchased the goods 
from a licensed manufacturer, distributors 
dealers, adultrated or misbranded articles would 
be marketed by manufacturers, distributors 
dealers, as well as purchased from them with 
impurity. And Vendor should not be deemed to 
have committed an offence pertaining to the sale 
of any adultrated or misbranded article of food 
proves that he purchased the article from any 
manufacturer with a writen warranty in the 
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prescribed from these provisions are designed 
for the health of the nation. 
Therefore, a warranty is enjoined. No laxity 
should be permitted. Judicial attitude has viewed criffies 
of food adultration in the light of prevention of health 
of the nation. In Jagdxsh PrsBsd V. State of Bihsr^•^^^ 
the Supreme Court, has regarded the health of nation ss 
touch stone of social control. The court has laid down 
the guideline for understanding the nature of the wrong 
which affects the public at large on vital matters. 
According to the court: 
It must be a thing essential for the certain of 
the community when crystalised it is supplied 
when sublimated it is serviced. It depends in 
most cases on teh angle from which you view and 
lens you use food is supplied so as shipping and 
wagons kerosene and gasoline and yet they are 
services. 
Judicial attitude is no longer soft towards such 
antisocial acts as food adultration. Thus in Banhat Lai 
y- State cf Rajasthan.26b ^^e district Magistrate had 
used the extreme weapon of detaining the trader under 
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971, to 
prevent him from continuing food adultration activities, 
64-
Rejecting the petitions, the court remarked that the 
preventive action as distinguished from the punitive one 
for such acts lay on the ground that an activity of the 
kind of adultration, was justified, because it was 
prejudicial to the interest of essential to the life of 
the community the extreme action of detention is not uo-
warranted against person who engage themselves in such 
activities. 
P,K, Tejani V, fi,R, Dsnco^' which is a trend 
setter decision of Supreme Court. It was a case under 
section 7 of the Act dealing with the prohibition of 
manufacture, sale etc. of certain articles of food. The 
supreme court quite vividly stated that section 7 casts 
an absolute obligation regardless of bad faith and 
jr/cm r^r... If somebody has sold any article of food in 
contravention to any of the provisions in the sub-
section, he must be guilty.^ The appellant^^ did not 
challange the fact of adultration, rather he said that 
the article in question was not meant for human 
consumption, but was meant for Pooja and therefore, he 
should not be liable for selling adultrated article of 
food. It appears that the lawyers in the country are 
lying to dilute the rigour of absolute liability by 
exploiting the religious sentiments of the community. 
The prosecution failed to prove that the article in 
S5 
question was meant for human consumption, l^ aturally then 
the court had to give the benefit of doubt. The 
observation of Justice Beg are remarkable: 
It is true that rn.)!--^ .-i-.-. in the ordinary or 
usual sense of the term is not required fur 
proving the offence defined by section 7 of the 
Prevention of Food Adultration Act, 1954. It is 
enough if an article of adultrated food is 
either manufactured for sale, or stored or sold 
or distributed in contravention of any provision 
of the Act or of any rule made there under. 
Hevertheless, the prosecution has to prove, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that what was stored or 
sold was food in use of article sold was 
not contrary or irrelevant.. It is more correct 
to say that it is presumed from the nature of 
article itself or the circumstances and manner 
of offencing it for sale, where circumstances 
raise a genuine doubt on the question whether 
what kept by a seller was "food" at all, this 
must be resolved by evidence in the case. After 
all if what is stored or sold in a shop was 
neither "Food nor meant to be to used could 3 
person be prosecuted on the ground that he sold 
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it is an aduitrated condition. Hence where 
section 7 prohibits manufacturer sale or storage 
or distribution of certain, types of food it 
necessarily denotes articles intended for human 
consumption as food. It becomes the duty of the 
prosecution to prove that the article which is 
the subject matter of an offence is ordinary 
used for human consumption as food whenever 
reasonable doubts arise on this question. It is 
self evident that certain articles, such as milk 
or bread or butter, or food grains or meant for 
human consumption as food. These are matter of 
common knowledge. Other articles may be presumed 
to be meant for human consumption from 
rep resentation made about them or from 
circumstances in which they are offered for 
sale". 
The 'Pooja' argument appeared again in case of 
Stste of Kersls V, Rsjsppsn Ns±r,^^ This time it met a 
very serious condemnation by the hands of Kerala High 
Court. The "Pooja article was turmeric powder ( '-- ) so 
commonly used in Hindu ceremonies. The High Court said: 
The Prevention of Food Adultration Act 
prohibits the sale in an aduitrated condition of 
an article which is food under the Act. An 
ST 
article is food if it satisfies the definition 
of food under the Act. A standard has been fixed 
for an article and its sale is prohibited under 
the rules framed under the Act. If it food' 
under the Act it is immaterial it is not used as 
such, in particular areas of its use as food 
confined to particular class of persons. An 
article which is food does not lose its 
character as food by the fact that it is also 
used or sold other purposes. If an article is a 
food it is not a defence in a trial under the 
Act that there was an agreement between the 
vendor and the customer that it would not be 
used as food. Putting a label on the container 
that the article is sold for other purposes and 
not as food is no guarantee that an article 
which is food will not be used as such by 
purchaser and it will not escape the Vendor from 
liability under the Act for sale of adultrated 
food . 
Thus where the accused sold from his provision 
shop turmeric powder in packet with a la bei that it 
is meant for Poooa' and the same was found 
adultrated, the accused could not escape froai 
68 
liability under the Act on ground that he did not 
deal it as food. 
In State of Orisss V. K, Rsjeshi^ar HBO 1'=>9I 
The Supreme Court held that Prevention of Food 
Adultration Act, 1954 is a welfare legislation to 
prevent health hazards by consuming adultrated food. 
The nii-.r,'^^ rca is not an essential ingredient. It is a 
social evil and the Act prohibits comTnission of the 
offence under the Act. The essential ingredient is 
sale to the purchaser by the vendor . It is not 
material to establish the capacity of person • -
v-i--. the owner of the shop to prove his authority to 
sell the adultrated food exposed for sale in the 
shop. It is enough for the prosecution to establish 
that the person who sold the adultrated articles of 
food had sold it to the purchaser (including the 
food inspector) and that the food inspector 
purchased the same in strict compliance with the 
provision of the Act. 
A perusal of the above cases show a string 
tendency of the court regarding the strict liability 
principle. Food adulteration as a part of socio-
economic offence has assumed grave proportion. The 
social interest underlying in the health and well 
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being of the nation deserves strongest protection. 
The deterimental effect of adulteration to human 
health necessitates that /^rf-n& /p-.;-. as a principle of 
traditional criminal law be done away with. 
Imposition of strict liability seems to be only 
alternative to check the menace of adulteration. The 
judicial exuberence in the field is worth praise. 
3. THE OPIUM ACT 1878: 
Under the scheme of Act, the mere possession 
of opium invites condemnation. Under section 9 of 
the Act, a person is strictly be held liable if he 
possess opium. Similarly person associated with 
transportation will also be strictly liable. Opiam 
being dangerous to human health the law prohibits 
the consumption and sale of it. 
4. THE ESSEHTIAL SUPPLIES (TEMPORARY POWERS) ACT, 1946 
Similarly, cases under section 7 of the essential 
Supplies (Temporary power) Act, 1946 also embodies the 
principle of strict liability which reads: 
The central government so far as it appears to 
it to be necessary or expedient for maintenance 
or increasing supplies of any essential 
commodity or for securing the equitable 
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distribution and availability at fair prices may 
be notified by order for regulating or 
prohibiting the production, supply and 
distribution thereof and trade and commeroe 
therein. 
In P'lanu f}-/F.r^^ where a person was accused under 
S.3(i) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary power) Act, 
for contravention of clause 14 of the Indian Cloth 
Dealers Control Order, it was held that the doctrine of 
fiK-tr-.-^ /fri, which is the second essential ingredient of 
crime is wholly out of place in construing offences 
falling under the Act. Modern statute creates a large 
number of offences which are absolute, in the sense, 
that as regards the act as if, as sufficient •'w .-, 
facie proof, and presence are held to peripheral factors 
in construing such crimes. 
Similarly where the accused is found to have made 
a false declaration of the stock of rice and paddy, 
flase to his knowledge too, no question of the want of 
/7)f?r;s rea arises, as the notification was issued with a 
view to maintain supplies and services essential to the 
life of the community and on the same basis the export 
of food grains without the permit is made a punishable 
offences where there is notification of the uhief 
commissioner of the effect. In this case the driver and 
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cleaner of a particular lorry, was had no knowledge that 
it contained bags of prohibited rice and paddy. Lack of 
knowledge proved of no avail and court held him guilty 
of the offence Likewise in - <- ;VL,,,C>,, ',<:,,. , "^  the 
accused a iicencee who sells rice issues receipts but 
fails to note their address or receipt is consider 
under section 7 of the act. 
5. IHDIAH EXPLOSIVES ACT, 1884 
Under the Indian Explosive Act 1884 the intention 
of rule 81 is that the person holding the licences shall 
himself whether he is present or not on the licence 
premises, be responsible for whatever operations are 
carried on in connection with manufacture, possession or 
sale of explosive. He must see that the prohibition 
which is imposed by Rule 81 is not tempered within any 
way and when there is a contravention of the said rule 
the convention is rightly held under section 5(3) of the 
Act. 3^ 
The state of mind of a person or his knowledge or 
his intention is immaterial for the purpose of 
constituting an offence under section 5 and 6 of the 
Act. Therefore, stoking of prohibited explosive is 
punishable without any proof of nit-nh ,\.,-». 
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6. THE ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1955 
The convictions under 3.7(1) of the Essential 
Commodities Act, 1955, for contravening clause 13(i) of 
the Calcutta Wheat (Movement) Control Order, 1955 and 
section 7 or the Essential Supplies (Temporary Power) 
Act 1948 for contravening U.P. oil seeds and oil seeds 
products control order are held, the basis of liability 
being strict in nature. 
7. THE DEFEHCE OF IHDIA ACT, 1938 
In SrinivBS Msl Bhairaliys V^ EmpioyBr the 
appelants were convicted under the Defence of India Buie 
1939 relating to control of prices. In this particular 
case, the second appellant was employed by the first who 
had entrusted him with the duty of allowing the 
appropriate quality itself to each retail dealer and 
nothing on the buyer licences the quality had received 
When the servant failed to comply with the statutory 
provision the master is liable as no question of -. / 
/(?..( arises. 
8. THE SHOP AMD COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMEHT ACT 1947 
Another set of decisions relates to the Shops and 
Commercial Establishment Act 1947. Section 10 of the Act 
makes obligatory on employer to keep his shop used on a 
weekly day. He cannot made the mandate of the law by 
*r^ 
asking the members of his family to keep his shop open 
on holding and if a person does it, he is accordingly 
guilty. Section 10 applies to every person having charge 
of doing the business of the shop and every such person 
is under a legal obligation to comply with the provision 
of the Act, even though, he may not have an employee in 
the shop.^^ 
In D,D, \ferma V, StsteA^ The appellant was 
convicted for breach of the rules of the C.P. Shops and 
Commercial Establishment Act 1947. The provision for 
the contravention of which he was convicted. Under the 
law the employer is required. Under the law the employer 
is required to maintain a register of employees and to 
exibit notice specifiying the daily hours of works and 
the days of the week. But the employer was found to 
continue the work even on holidays and allowed person 
employed to work. Thus he was strictly held liable. 
9. The Indian Motor Vehicles Act 1956: 
The provision in the Indian Motor Vehicle Act, 
1958 also fasten the liability in an absolute manner. 
The offences created under the statute are governed by 
the principles of strict section 72 of the Act. 
The state government may prescribe conditions fur 
the issue of permits to heavy transport vehicles by the 
State or Regional Transport Authorities and may prohibit 
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or restrict the use of such vehicles in any area oi 
route within the state. Section 124 reads: 
Whoever, drives or motor vehicle or causes or 
allows a motor vehicle to be driven m 
contraventions of any permit issued, 
contravention of any prohibition or restriction 
imposed under section 74 shall be punishable. 
10. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FEBA) of 1973 
is another piece of legislation which prescribes for 
strict liability principle for curbing economic 
offences. The preambular assertion goes on to say that 
Act consolidates and amends the law regulating certain 
payments, dealings in foreign exchange and seculities, 
transactions indirectly affecting foreign exchange and 
import and export of currency and bullions, for the 
conservation of foreign exchange resources and to 
protect the economic interest of the country. Section 49 
and 50 of the Act incorporates strict liability m 
dealing with economic crimes. The sections are as under-
Where under any provision of this Act any 
permission or licence has been given or granted 
to any person subject to any conditions and -
^5 
(i) such person fails to cooiply with ail 
or any of such conditions; or 
(ii) any other person abets such person 
in not complying with all or any of such 
conditions, 
then, for the purposes of this Act,-
(a) in a case referred to in clause (i>, 
such person shall be deemed to have contravened 
such provision; and 
(b) in a case referred to in clause (ii), 
such other person shall be deemed to have 
abetted the contravention of such provision. 
Section 50 reads as: 
If any person contravenes any of the provisions 
of this Act other than section 13, clause (a) 
of sub-section (1) of section 18 and clause (a) 
of sub-section (1) of section 19] or of any 
rule, direction or order made thereunder, he 
shall be liable to such penalty not exceeding 
five times the amount or value involved in any 
such contravention or five thousand rupees, 
whichever is more, as may be adjudged by the 
Director of enforcement or any other officer of 
Enforcement not below the rank of an Assistant 
Director of Enforcement specially empowered in 
?6 
t h i s behalf by order of the Cen t r a l Governffieni 
(in either case hereinafter referred to as the 
adjudicating officer). 
Under this section, power of adjudication may be 
exercised by the Director of Enforcement or any other 
officer of Enforcement not below the rank of an 
Assistant Director of Enforcedment specially empowered 
in this behalf by order of the Central Government. 
Penalty under this section can be imposed upto five 
times the amount or value involved in the contravention 
or Rs.5000/- whichever is more. What the section 
prescribes is the maximum. When the section speaks of 
the maximum penalty, it is obvious that the authority 
has the discretion to impose any fine less than that 
also. The discretion which is conferred on the authority 
by the section has to be exercised in a judicial manner 
and the exercise of such discretion is a question of 
law. That being so appeal against it lies under section 
54 of the Act. Merr- rca is not an essential ingredient 
of offence under this section. ^  
The cardinal principle of criminal liability 
expressed in maxim actuS' non fscit reum nisi mens s^t 
rea, under the socio-economic offence occupy a 
peripheral space. Since the guilty intention does not 
• - _ 
constitute a necessary ingredient of crime, the accused 
can be convicted on the proof of commission of Act. The 
rise of socio-economic offences in menacing proportion 
compelled the legislature to undergo massive drafting of 
laws. From the discussion, it is quite discernable that 
the law tries to safeguard public welfare by regulatory 
m echanisro. It is under the background of public welfare 
and well being these laws were received well in society. 
The basis of these laws take unlike traditional crime do 
not lie in fault, vicarious, criminal liability 
principle (<.;•. L t Lis rp.-ii'^.^ riori fcH. .t ri-.wo .,--^:, ,•„• , ,•-- T , J> , _, 
rather in strict liability principle. The trend of 
change in favour of strict liability is a welcome step 
to regulate social welfare. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHAPTER IV 
(A) BURDEH OF PROOF IH STRICT LIABILITY OFFENCES: 
It has been observed so far that strict 
liability cannot be justified because it may lead to 
the conviction of innocent persons. Legislature has 
taken this criticism seriously and hence tried to 
save innocent persons by the device of what may be 
called the "shifting of burden of proof". Thus, the 
accused can exculpate hifflseif from the criminal 
liability by proving that he was not at fault.-^  
It seems reasonable, therefore, to have a rule 
for strict liability offences that if prosecution 
establiishes a prima facie case, by proving the 
facts constituting actus reus of the offences 
charged, accused should be convicted unless he 
affirmatively established that the situation proved 
occurred without fau It on his part. . To establish 
absence of fault it should be necessary for accused 
to prove that he was not negligent in relation to 
the legal duty proved by prosecution. At first right 
this seems to put upon the accused the difficult 
task of proving a negative, but closer analysis of 
what the law would actually require it is easy to 
show that nothing of the kind is contemplated. 
sa 
In majority of cases the basis of the charge 
against the accused will be either improper action 
on his part, such as selling something outside 
permitted hours, or an improper omision, such as 
failure to remove his automobile from metered 
parking spot after the permitted period of parking 
has expired. Ail that is required of accused is that 
he shows in either care that his behaviour, whether 
of omission or commision of both, was reasonable in 
the circumstances. If the accused relies on 
reasonableness of his behaviour, there are three 
possibilities. He may argue on the basis either of 
the facts proved by the prosecution; or facts proved 
by the accused; or a combination of the two. In so 
far as the accused is not arguing from the facts 
proved by prosecution, he must prove the fact, 
material to his argument himself. Here again there 
is no reason for a departure from the usual rule, 
which is that wherever a burden of proof rest upon 
defendant to criminal proceedings, he is not 
required to establish any proposition more 
rigorously than upon the balance of probability.'^ 
Therefore, the accused should establish any facts on 
which he relies as showing that he acted reasonably 
upon the balance of probability. 
S3 
(i) FHKSiJKFTHJH UK JNNJKZKHO:: 
Burden of proof is yet another important 
element of criminal law which deserves attention in 
the context of strict liability offences , Burden 
of proof in criminal cases means the duty to prove 
the guilt of the accused. Under the English Criminal 
Law, and Indian law is no different, burden of 
proving the guilt of the accused is always upon the 
prosecution, and until so proved, the accused is 
presumed to be innocent."^  
This rule has always been considered to be 
sacrosnct and any effort to temper with it or 
undermine it has met with staunch opposition and 
g 
abhored. It has been reiterated every now and then it 
was not for the accused to prove his innocence, since 
his innocence is presumed and the prosecution must be 
obliged to prove his guilt and to prove it beyond all 
reasonable doubt further that prosecution could not 
succeed merely on the balance of probabilities. The 
benefit of even little doubt accrued to the accused and 
even in the matter of construing statutes, themsxim 
•iL,in.ii, , : iMBri, rinLt- iegf (Construing penal statutes in 
favour of citisen; was more acceptable with the result 
that it came to be recognised that no man could be put 
to the peril on ambiguity. The prosecution cannot derive 
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any benefit from the weakness of the defence theory and 
suspicion, however, grave, cannot take piae of prouf 
These rules and principles were adopted to ensure the 
protection of the liberty and life of individual. 
r , ^'•i-i--r r..ld has observed in this behalf that "no 
rule ofcriminal law is more important than that 
which requires the prosecution to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the 
first place this means that it is for the 
prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt and not 
for the latter to establish his innocence; he is 
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In 
criminal cases, the crown can not succeed on a 
mere balance of probabilities. IF there is a 
reasonable doubt whether the accused is guilty, 
hemust be acquitted". 
According to Lord Sankay, the principle that 
the accused must be presumed to be innocent unless 
proved to be guilty is the golden thread which runs 
through the fabric of English criminal law. 
(b) SHIFTIHG OF BURDEH OF PROOF 
But as painted out by Williams unhappily 
parliament regards the principle with indifference 
one might almost say with contempt.^ 
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The statute book contains many offences in 
which the burden of proving his innocence is case 
on the accused. In addition, the courts Jiave 
enuciated principles that have the effect of 
shifting the burden particularly in strict liability 
cases. The sad thing is that there has expediency 
for the departures from the cherished principle; it 
has been done through carelessnes and lack of 
subtltty. What lies at the bottom of the various 
rules shitting the burden of proof is the idea that 
it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly 
convincing evidence on certain issues from its own 
hand, and itis therefore, for the accured to give 
evidence on them if he wishes to escape, this idea 
is perfectly defensible and needs to be expressed in 
legal rules, but it is not the same as the burden of 
proof.^^ There is a clear difference between 
shifting the burden of proof, or risk of non-
persuation of the jury, and shifting the evidential 
of burden of introducing evidence in proof of one s 
12 
case. "^  It is not a grave departure from 
traditional princj|JLes to shift the evidential 
burden, though such a shifting does take away from 
the accused the right to make a submission. It may 
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in effect force him to go into the witness-box. 
Where the law shifts the evidential burden of the 
accused the prosecution need not give any evidence, 
or need give only slight evidence, on that issue, to 
be met with a submission of "no case", This means 
that the accused must, for his own safety, make some 
answer. All that the shifting of evidential burden 
does at the final stage of the case is to allow the 
court to take into account the silence of the 
accused or the absence of satisfactory explanations 
appearing from his evidence. Hence it the accused 
gives some evidence consistent with his innocence 
which may reasonably be true, even though the court 
is not satisfied that it is true, the accused is 
entitled to be acquitted, for the burden of proof 
proper remains on the prosecution. 
(B> STRICT LIABILITY AHD JUDICIAL PROCESS--
The question whether the common law 
requirement of .•»(-)J'---f f c^  must be imported into every 
crime defined in the statute even where it is not 
expressly mentioned. 
In R V. Prince^* (1875) and R V. Toloson^^ (1889) 
are the two land-marks decisions on the subject. The 
8T 
conception of .-..iin.' n . was introduced into the 
statutory offence by the Judges by means of 
constrution without any parliamentary sanction. 
There are two school of thought: 
One embodied in the judgement of Wright- J. In 
Sheeras V. De Rutzen 1895^^ that in every 
statute ifitr,-.^ rac-. is to be implied unless the 
contrary is shown: and The second is that of 
Kannedy, L. J. In Hobbs V. Winchester 
17 
corporation (1910) that you ought to construe 
the statute literally unless there is something 
to show that /-•#= ns- r* ., is required. Another 
view runs that ii,{ ji- ri-,-. is implied in certain 
statutes although there are no words in the 
statutes itself to show a recoginition of /''£.' 
'-*=:-•-( and judges should construe for it on their 
own authority. 
For a better illustration of the subject it 
would be useful to discuss some of the cases in 
details. 
The first of such cases is R V. Prince (1885). 
Henry Prince the prisoner was charged under section 
55 of the offenses. Against the Person Act, 1861 
for having taken one Annie Philip, an unmarried girl 
being under the age of 16 years, out the possesion 
§& 
and against the will of her father. In England it is 
an offence to take or cause to be taken an unmarried 
girl, being under the age of 16 years out of the 
possession and against the will of her father or 
mother or any person having lawful gurdainshipcff her. 
It was proved that the priosner did take the girl 
out of the possession and agaisnt the will of her 
father and also that she was under 16 years.All the 
facts necessary to support the conviction existed 
except that the girl, though proved by her father to 
be 14 years old looked very much older than that and 
jury found upon reasonble evidence that before the 
defendant took her away she has told him that she 
was of 18 years and that the defandant bonafide, 
believed that statement and that such was 
reasonable. 
It was contented that although section 55 of 
the statute under which offence was created did not 
insist on the knowledge on the part of prisoner that 
the girl was under 16 as necessary to constitute the 
offence, the common law doctrine of -hf^-:- --; a should 
neverthless be applied and that there could be no 
conviction in the absence of criminal intent. 
&9 
It was held that the prisoner believecjthat the 
girl was 18 year old is no defence. The following 
judgement by Black Burn J. deserver to be quoted. 
In this case we must take as found by Jurry that the 
prisoner took unmarried girl out of the 
possesion and against the will of her father and 
that the girl was infact under the age of 16, 
but that the prisoner bonafide and on reasonable 
grounds , belived that she was above 16 viz., 18 
years old.The question arises as to what 
constitute a taken out of the possesion of her 
father, not as to what circumtances might 
justify such taken as not been unlawful, nor as 
to how far an honest though mistaken belief that 
such circumtances as would justify the taking 
existed, might from an excuse, for as the case 
reserved we must take it as proved that the girl 
was in the possesion of her father and that he 
took her, knowingly that he tresspassed on the 
father's rights and had no colour of excuse for 
so doing. 
The question, therefore, is reduced to this : 
what ever the words in section 55, that " who so 
ever shall take any unmarried girl, being under the 
90 
age of 16 out of the possesion of her fsther , are 
to be read as if he were been under the age of 16 
and knowingly she was under that age". No such words 
are contained in the statute; nor is there. The 
word" loalaciously" knownigly in other word used that 
can be said to involve a smiliar meaning. 
The argument in favour of the prisoner must, 
therefore, entiriy proceed on the ground that in 
general, a guilty mind is an essential ingredieiit in 
crime and that where a statute creates a crime, the 
intention of legsilature should be presumed to 
inciulde knowingly in the definition of the crime 
and the statute should be read as if that word were 
inserted unless the contrary intention apperars. We 
need not inquire at present whether the cannon of 
construction goes quite so far as above statute. For 
we are of the opinion that the intention of the 
legislature sufficiently appear to have been to 
punish the abduction unless girl , infact was of 
such an age as to ask her consent an excuse, 
irrespective whether he knew her to be too young to 
given an effectual consent and to fix that age at 16 
But what the statute contemplates and what I 
say is wrong, that he has taken of a female of such 
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tender years that she is properly called a girl and 
can be said to be in another's possesion in that 
others care or charge. Ho argument is necessary to 
prove that is enough to state the case. The 
legislature has enacted that if any one do this 
wrong act, he does it at own risk of her turning out 
under 16, This opinion gives full scope to the 
doctrine of ni&ri:- ruc,. If the taker belived he had 
the fathers consent though wrongly, he would have no 
ihi-n--^ n-o. So if he did not know she was in possesion 
nor in the care or charge of any one in these cases 
he would not known he wafe doing the act forbidden by 
the statute an act which, if he know she was in 
possesion and in care or charge of any one, was 8 
crime. He would not know that he is doing an act 
wrong in it self, whatever, was his intention if 
done without lawful cause. 
In this case disti'Bction was drawn between 
acts that were in themselves innocent but made 
punishable by statute (Hulum Prohibitum) and acts 
that were intrinsically wrong or immoiai. In the 
former as belief; a reasonable belief in the 
exercise of facts whccth if true, would take the care 
out of mischief of the statute, would be a good 
9a 
defence, but in the later case such a belief was 
iiriffiaterial unless of course the law made it 
otherwise. The man who acted under such erreneous 
belief took the risk and shuold suffer the 
consequences. 
The same principle has applied in other cases 
also. A man was held liable for assaulting a police 
officer in the excecution of his duty, though he did 
know he was a police officer why ? becasue the act 
was wrong in itself. 
It seems to be impossible, where a persofi 
takes a girl out of her father's possesion, not 
knowing whether she is or is not under 16, to say 
that he is not guilty , and equally impossible when 
he believed that erroneously, that she is old enough 
for him to do a wrong act with safety. I think 
conviction should be affirmed. 
Queen V. Tolson (1880) is another important 
case on the subject : In this case the prisoner was 
married to Mr.Tolson on Sep.11.1880.Mr.Tolson 
deserted her on Dec.13,1881. The prisoner and her 
father made inquiries above Tolson and learnt from 
his elder brother and from general report that he 
had been lost in a vessel bound for America, which 
went down with all hands on board.On Jan.10, 1887, 
9S 
the prisoner supposing herself to be a widow, went 
through the ceremoney of marrige with another man. 
The circumstances were all known to the second 
husband and the marriage ceremoney was in no way 
concealed. In Dec, 1887, Tolson returned from 
America. Thereafter, the prisoner was charged for 
offence of bigamy under section 57 of the Offence 
Against The Persons Act, 1861, for having gone 
through ceremony of marriage with in seven years 
after he had been deserted by her husband. The jury 
found that at the time of second marriage she is in 
good faith on reasonable grounds believed her 
husband to be dead. 
Section 57 provides : 
"Whoever, being married, shall marry any other 
person during the life of the former husband or 
wife shall be guilty of felony. 
"Proviso to the same section lays down: 
"Nothing in this act shall extend to any person 
marrying a second time whose husband or wife 
shall have been continually absent from such 
person for the space of seven years past, and 
shall not have been known by such person to be 
living within that time." 
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It was held that a bonafi debeiief on reasonable 
grounds in the death of the husband at the time of the 
second marrige afforded a good defence of the 
indictment, and that the conviction was wrong. 
In this case the following principles were laid 
down : 
(i) Although prima facie and has as a general rule there 
must be a mind at fault before there can be a crime, 
it is not an inflexible rule, and a statute may 
relate to such a subject matter and may be so 
framed as to make an act criminal whether there 
have been any intension to break the law or 
otherwise to do wrong or not. There is a large body 
of municipal law in the present day which so 
conceieved. 
(ii> Prima facy statute was satisfied when the case was 
brought within its terms, and it then lay upon the 
defendent to prove that the violation of the law 
which had taken place, had been committed accidentiy 
or innocently so far as he was concerned. Suppose a 
man had taken up by mistake one or two baskets alike 
and of similar weight, one of which contained 
innocent articles belonging to himself and the other 
marked government stores, and was caught with the 
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wrong basket in his hand. He would by his own act 
have brought himself within the very words of the 
statute who would think of convincting him. 
(iii) A common law an honest and reasonable belief in the 
existance of circumstances, which, if true would make 
the act for which a prisoner is indicted an innocent 
act has always been held to be a good defence. This 
doctrine is embodied in the maxim c.cut,.- , .•, 
/••>:,.!;„ ,-, IV ^  n,i.,ir. i-xt ;,-.-,-:,.' Honest and reasonable 
mistake stands in fact on the same footing as absence 
of the reasoning faculty, as in infancy ; perversion 
of that faculty, as in lunacy. These exceptions apply 
equally in case of statu1»ry offences unless they are 
excluded expressly or by necessary implication. 
(iv) It is a general rule that an alleged offender is 
deemed to have acted under that state of acts which 
he in good faith and on reasonable ground believed to 
exist, when it did the act alleged to be an offence. 
In this case the accused acted in good faith 
upon reasonable and probable cause of belief without 
rashness or negligence, therefore she is not to be 
considered as guilty as she was found to be mistaken. 
In case of an offence of bigamy the accused 
can make a defence by proving a continuous absence 
for seven years. And that even such an absence 
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will not be a defence if the prosecution can prove 
knowledge on the part of the accused, within seven years 
of the first carriage, that the first wife or husband, 
as the case »ay be, was still alive. 
In i?- V. PrincB the prisoner knew that in taking 
the girl away from her father he was, altogether apart 
from the question of her age, doing an improper and 
immoral act, while in the present case there was nothing 
wrong in the marrioge of the prisoner, who resonably 
supposed herself to be a widow. 
Post 1947 phase: Response of Indian Courts 
Yet another case is Stste^ at Nah^r^^htra V. 
M^H^Seorge^^ (A.I.R, 1965 S.C.722) In this case the 
Supreme Court considered the application of the 
principle of .nvcnr-.. rss. in statutory offences. The accused 
M.H. George was a passsanger from Zurich to Manila in a 
Swiss plane. When the plane landed at the airport in 
Bombay on 28th Nov. 1962. It was found on search that 
the respondent carried 34 kilos of gold bars on his 
person and that he had not declared it in the "manifest" 
for transit. By reason of a central government 
notification of the year 1948, the bringing of gold into 
India was prohibited except with the permission of 
Reserve Bank. But by a notification of the Be.servf^  
r^ 
Bank, gold, in transit from place outside India to 
places similarly situated, which was not removed fiom 
the aircraft except for the purpose of transhipment waf; 
exempted from the operation of the notification of the 
central government. The Reserve Bank of India on Mov. 8 
1962 by another notification modified its earliei 
exemption and it was necessary that, the gold must be 
declared in the "Manifest" of the aircraft. The 
respondent was prosecuted for bringing gold into Indis 
in contravention of section 8 (1) of the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with the notification 
issued thereunder and was convicted under section 23 of 
the Act. 
The Presidency Magistrate found him guilty but the 
Bombay High Court held that he was not guilty on the 
ground that ••^r-r.i^ rsc, being a necessary ingredient of the 
offence, the respondent who brought gold into India for 
transit to Manila didn't know that during the cruciftl 
period such a condition had been imposed which brought 
the case with in the terms of the statute. On appeal by 
the state the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and found 
the guilty for contravention of the provisions of 
section 8 (1> read with notification issued thereunder 
9S 
The following principles were laid down by the 
Supreme Court in this case : 
Ci) The act is designed to safeguarding and conserving 
foreign exchange which is essential to economic life 
of a developing country. The provisions have, 
therefore, to be stringent and so framed as to 
prevent unregulated transaction which might upset 
the scheme underlining the controls; and in a larger 
context, the penal provisions are aimed at 
eliminating smuggling which is a concomittant uf 
controls over the free movements of goods or 
currencies. 
(ii> The very object and purpose of the Act and its 
effectiveness as an instrument and for the 
prevention of smuggling would be entirly frustrated 
if a condition were to be read into section 8 (1) or 
section 23 (lA) of the Act quflllifying the plain 
words of the enactment, that the a.ccused should be 
proved to have knowledge that he was contraveniiig 
the law before he could be held to have contravened 
the provision, 
(iii) The very concept of 'bringing' or 'sending' would 
exclude and involuntary bringing of voluntary 
sending.But if the bringing into India was a 
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conscious act and was done with the intention of 
bringing it into India the mere "Bringing" 
constituents the offence and there is no other 
ingredient i.e. necessary in order to constitute a 
contravention of section 8 (1) than that conscious 
physical act of bringing. If then under section 8 
(1> the conscious physical act of "Bringing" 
constitutes the offence, section 23 (lA) does not 
import any further condition for the imposition of 
liability than what is provided for in section 8 
(1). 
(iv> Unless the statute either clearly or by necessary 
implication rules out '•'<(;<- ft-., as a constituent part 
of a crime a defendent should not be found guilty of 
an offence against the criminal law unless he has 
got a guilty mind. Absolule liability is not to be 
lightly presumed but has to be clearly established, 
(v) Section 8 and the notification do not contain an 
absolute prohibition against bringing or sending 
into India any gold. They do not expressly exclude 
//,. r;5. /i-A. So far as the question of exclusion of 
ihi.'n . r.T..--, by implication is concerned, the law does 
not become nugatory if element of -/c-^  n •-, ^jas read 
into it for their would still be persons who would 
be bringing into India gold with the knowledge that 
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they would be breaking the lav?. In such 
• circumstances no question of exclusion of ••> -'-
by necessary implication can arise, 
(vi) f!r;,=> '-fcr. in the sense of actual knowledge that act 
done is contrary to law is not an essential 
ingredient of the offence under section 8 (1) read 
with section 23 (lA) of the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act, 1947. Thus mere voluntary act of 
bringing gold into India without permission of the 
Reserve Bank constitutes the offence. 
Hathu Lai V. State of M.P^®. (AIR. 1986 SC. 43) is 
another important case on the point. In this case the 
appe llant had in stock 885 maunds and 2.1/4 seers of 
wheat for the purpose of sale without licence. He 
contended that he had stored the foodgrains after 
applying for the licence and was in the belief that it 
would be issued to him. He had also deposited the 
requisite licence fee. He was purchasing foodgrains 
from time to time and sending returns to the Licensing 
Authority showing the grains purchased by him. He was 
prosecuted for committing an offence under section 7 of 
the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for contravening an 
order made under section 3 of the same Act. It was held 
that : 
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""; ,;-,, is an essential ingredient of a 
oriiriinal offence. Doubtless a statutes may 
exclude the element of ••<^ "• -t-c. But it is a 
sound rule of construction adopted in England 
and also accepted in India to construe a 
statutory provision creating an offence in 
conformity with the common law rather than 
against it unless the statute expressly or by 
necessary implication excluded -Aw- , . . . The 
mere fact that the object of the statute 
expressly or by necessary implication excluded 
„i€'rr£~ rf-.,:,, or the mere fact that the object of 
the statute is to promote welfare activities or 
to eradicate a grave social evil by itself not 
decisive of the question whether the element of 
guilty mind is excluded from the ingredient of 
an offence. >'U ris^ .-tr, by necessary implication 
may be excluded from a statute only where it is 
absolutely clear that the implementation of the 
object of the statute would otherwise be 
defeated. The nature of .•ICUE^ .-f.» that would be 
implied in a statute creating an offence depends 
on the object of Act of the provision thereof." 
In the instant case the storage of foodgrains was 
under a bonafide belief that he could legally do so. He 
loa 
did not, therefore, intentionally contrsvence the 
provisions of S.7 of the Act or those of the order made 
under S.3 of the Act. Therefore, he was not liable. 
IH STATE OF ORRISA V. V.K.RAJESHMAR RAO (1991 S.C)^® 
The Supreme Court held that prevention of Food 
Adultration Act, 1954 is a welfare legislation to 
prevent health hazards by consuming adultrated food. The 
,',7r-v rr-s is not an essential ingrediant, it is a social 
evil and the act prohibits cominission of the crime under 
the act. The essential ingredient is sale to the 
purchaser by the vendor. It is not material to establish 
the capacity of person v i-.-,,-v . i. the owner of the shop 
to prove his authorty to sale the adultrated food 
exposed for sale in the shop. It is enough for the 
prosecution to establish that the person who sold the 
adultrated article of food had sold it to the purchaser 
(including the food inspector) and that the food 
inspector purchased the same in strict compliance with 
in the provisions of the act. It is not necessary for 
the sanctioning authority to consider that person sold 
is the owner, servent agent or partner or relative of 
the owner or was duly authorized in this belief. 
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(A) WHEH MORDS DEHOTIHG MENS REA HAVE BEEH EXPRESSLY 
IHCORPORATED IH STATUTES. 
In Indian Penal Code »any words have been used to 
denote -/jrw- n ,--. such as voluntary, reason to believe, 
dishonestly fraudently. But the words which are used in 
socio-economic statutes and have an element of fn, r. --,, 
have not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. 
These words are corruptly Malignantly and 
Maticiously - Wantonly, and Bashly and HegliAEwtly. 
Although these words have also been used in Indian Penal 
Code but they have not been defined in the Code. When 
words denoting r/ic ,,•• ri-,\ have been expresly incorporated 
in Statute, ri,r,r- n-a-, is to be taken into account. 
(b) WHEH MEHS REA IS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM THE STATUTE 
In such cases 'f.c;,*:. rr,, is not taken into 
consideration, and the accused is strictly held liable. 
For example in case of ^c^t i-.nd '/r :&; ,-c,r ?, ,-;.';, whether 
the accused had a guilty mind or not, he is liable for 
the act done by him. 
(c) WHERE STATUTE IS SILEHT AS TO THE REQUIREMEHT OF MEHS REA: 
Sometimes a statute is silent on mens rea i.e., 
nothing is said about the guilty intention of mind. For 
example offences mentioned under section 93 to 88A of 
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the Indian Penal Code describe this type of model. In 
.s'uch cases the liability is absolute and without any 
reference to •'"i'l'- :~f c-.. The reason for this; as pointed 
out by iv-^.J} :(.-<iii G,, is that the general principle of 
criminal jurisprudence is that although the statute is 
silent on the point a requirement of mens rea is to be 
implied. In such case, the courts have got direction for 
applying •!•<: > - -rr,. 
(d) WHERE MEHS REA IS OF MILD TYPE: 
In such cases merely knowledge is enough to 
consitute an offence. 
(e) VICARIOUS LIABILITY: 
Like strict responsibility vicarious liability may 
also be created by statute. Vicarious liability may, 
however, be inferred from the language of the statute. 
In r}:ic.r, w i.h. ii ;H:,I,V',^^ 
The defendant, an occupier and licence of a 
refreshment house employed a manager for running the 
refreshment house. He used to visit it only once or 
twice a week. He had given express instruction to the 
manager that no prostitutes were to be allowed to 
congregate in the premises of the house. The manager, 
inspite of this instruction to the contrary; allowed 
some women, whom he know to be prostitutes, to 
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congregate on the premices. 
The defendant even though had no personal 
knowledge of it, was held liable for knowledge suffering 
prostitutes to meet and remain in the refreshment house. 
In ., W ;>:.>>•:: Love was the director of a company 
he has indicated for printing a book containing some 
obscene liable when the book was printed, he was ill and 
know nothing about its contents. It was held that while 
the company was liable for the acts done in his absence; 
the director for the company could not be held liable 
for such acts in his absence especially whom he had no 
knowledge of it. 
Suppose under a statute it is an offence to serve 
alcohai knowledge to a minor in a bar. A private limited 
company owns a bar, the management of which is left 
exclusively to a paid manager B: Alchohai is freely 
served to all including minors by the servants of bar, B 
shutting his eyes to the practice, Accordingly alcohai 
was served to c, a minor by a servant of the company 
having reason to believe that he was minor, neither B 
nor any director of the company. Know of this fact. In 
this case the company as well as B would be liable for 
serving alcohai to the minor against the statute because 
as a matter of practice alcohai was used to be served to 
minors within his knowledge and he never instructed the 
los 
servants, to refrain from this practice. Secondly, the 
manager would be liable for the acts of his servants for 
his failure to employ such p>ersons only who would not 
within the permissible limit of the statute. 
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have in prescribing punishment excluded the requiremrent 
of mens rea. 
The following are the some of the reasons 
suggested for the recognition of the principle of strict 
liability :-
(i) Almost all such offences are of minor nature and 
involve only pecunary penality and exclusion 
of enquiring into mens rea is not unjust where the 
only otit-come of the prosecution is a small pecunar/ 
penality . 
(2) It is difficult to procure adequate proof of mens 
rea in such offences. To permit such a defence would 
be to allow every violator to avoide liability 
merely by pleading lack of knowledge , 
(3) Public welfare legislations serve a social purpose 
by making an act punishable which though not 
instrinsically wrongful but which is punished in the 
public interest. That is these offences are merely 
mala prohibita 
(4) Having regard to the number of transgression that 
have ID be brought before the courts and to the fact 
that in most cases. The defendgtnt is probably 
culpable, while the proof of this mental culpability 
is difficult, it would be waste of time for the 
m 
court to have to enquire into the question.'^ 
(5) Another argument m support of strict liabiiit/ is 
the claim that it serves as a proo-f to stimulate 
increased care and efficency even by those who are 
already careful and efficient. 
As to the first argument it is not easy to see why 
the rightness of the penality should justify an 
abondonment of the requirement of culpability and m any 
event the penality is not the punishment that the 
defedfint receives, he also has to suffer the humilation 
of trial and of conviction, which are present in some 
degree even with these offences and which for 
respectable defendents are sharper penalties than 
anything e>!tracted from their pocket . Further m modern 
times fine is not the only penality m such offences. In 
addition to fine, imprisonment is also prescribed as 
punishment m many cases. 
Against strict liability it is said that practice 
of imposing small fines without enquiring into mens rea 
does not deter unscrupulous persons who are the real 
culprits. An attitude of greater discrimination between 
culpable offenders and others, imposing severe penaiit/ 
on the formerinstead of mmorcases on all sundr/, would 
result not m a better observence of the law^. 
ila 
Another objection against the principle of strict 
liability IS that it is an abuse of moral sentiments of 
community. To make a practice of branding people as 
criminal who are without immoral fault tends to weaken 
respect for the law and the social condomnation of those 
who break it . When it becomes respectable to be 
convicted the vitality of the criminal law has been 
sapped . 
Prof.Hail in his essay on criminal science post 
that :-
"It IS'becoming popularly recognised that strict 
liability has no place whatever m criminal law 
instead of libralization to punish the people 
despite the fact that there is no reason for 
blaming them at all. I have never any evidence 
which supports such liability in penal law, 
specially that it raises standards and protects 
the public. 
According to Hall, the soul reason of doctrine of 
strict liability no longer exist . Therefore two 
alternatives have been suggested. 
(1) That public welfare offences be seprated from the 
traditional crimes and enforced through 
administrative agencies and ; 
US 
(2) "That negligence be accepted as the sufficient 
degree of mens rea in statutory offences and the 
once be transferred to accused to prove that acted 
12 
with due care" 
One of the suggestions made, therefore is that the 
public welfare and similar regulations be removed from 
the Penal law. "That auspicious beginning would render 
more persuasive, as an initial reform, the allocation of 
these rules to a seprate code of civil offences 
requiring negligence and tried by administrative 
tribunals or civil courts. If at the same time, 
inspection, education and counsel were provided by 
regulatory boards, and the work of the criminal courts 
were restricted to violations involving mens rea, we 
might be well on the way to the solution of this 
problem ^. 
It may also be submitted that Strict liability 
offences should be punishable merely by fine. A fine is 
no more than any other loss of pecuniary property. 
Moreover, the society regards prison as a disgrace and 
puts it on totally different footing from payment of a 
fine- Most of the people expect sooner or later to be 
fined for something parking, speeding, and so on. If 
Parliament creates an offence but provides that it is 
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punishable only by a fine, it gi-^es a clear indication 
that it regards the offence as of a different order from 
"ordinary" or "true" crime. 
In these circumstances It is still possible to 
send a man to prison if he refuses to pay a fine or m 
some other way. 
Another suggestion is that in Strict liability 
offences fine may be accompanied by loss of licence, 
deportation, forfeiture or removal from office depending 
upon the nature of offence. 
To attach stigma of criminality the public 
approbation of crime is to be done. 
It IS also submitted that the intention to create 
Strict liability ought to be evidenced not only by the 
words of the statute, but also inferred from its social 
purpose. 
Finally absence of any guilty intention or 
knowledge on the part of the accused should be 
considered a factor in mitigation of punishment. 
It may now be said by way of final remark that 
the operation of offences of strict liability the 
context of criminal law which generally requires 
subjective fault akin to moral responsibility is bound 
to promote the kind of inconsistencies pointed out i n 
18 this study. Therefore the public welfare offences 
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attracting strict liability principle be seperated from 
the traditional crime and enforced through 
administrative agencies. 
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